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FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF ATLANTA;  AND NYU AND NBER 
Liquidity  Crises  in  Emerging  Markets: 
Theory  and  Policy 
1. Introduction 
The recent literature offers no shortage  of villains to blame for the finan- 
cial  crashes  in  Mexico,  East  Asia,  Russia,  and  Brazil: corruption  and 
cronyism,  lack of transparency  and imperfect democracy, misguided  in- 
vestment  subsidies  and  loan  guarantees,  external  deficits  that  are too 
large (or sometimes  too small), fixed exchange  rates that are maintained 
for too long (or abandoned  too readily), poor financial regulation,  exces- 
sive borrowing  abroad-the  list goes  on and on. 
It is tempting  to argue that several or even  all of these factors mattered 
for  recent  meltdowns.  But  such  a kitchen-sink  approach  would  help 
little  in  understanding  why,  when,  and  where  these  crises  happened. 
Which  one  of the many  weaknesses  exhibited  by the afflicted countries 
is necessary  for a crisis to occur? Can any of them conceivably  be sufficient 
to trigger a collapse?  There is also  the pesky  need  to formulate  policy. 
Central bankers and finance ministers  can at best tackle a few issues  at a 
time.  Where  should  they  focus  their efforts  to have  the best  chance  of 
avoiding  financial vulnerability? 
At the risk of oversimplifying,  in this paper we focus on a single factor 
behind  financial and currency distress: international  illiquidity, defined  as 
a situation  in which  a country's consolidated  financial system has poten- 
tial short-term obligations  in foreign currency that exceed  the amount  of 
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foreign  currency  it  can  have  access  to  on  short  notice.1  Illiquidity  is 
certainly not necessary  for currency crashes to occur. The EMS troubles of 
the early 1990s, for instance,  had more to do with governments'  desire to 
fight  unemployment  than  with  any  difficulties  in  servicing  short-term 
obligations.2  But illiquidity  comes  close  to  being  sufficient to  trigger  a 
crisis.  The  options  left  after creditors  lose  confidence  and  stop  rolling 
over  and  demand  immediate  payment  on  existing  loans-whether  to 
the  private  sector  as  in  Asia  or to  the  government  as  in  Mexico  and 
Brazil-are  painfully  few.  The collapse  of the  currency, of the  financial 
system,  or perhaps  both is the likely outcome.3 
We restrict our  focus  even  further by  stressing  the  role  of  domestic 
banks in causing  and transmitting  situations  of illiquidity. In doing so we 
miss  some  of the action: the world  now  knows  that in Indonesia  it was 
corporates that did much of the borrowing  and that faced severe illiquid- 
ity when  foreign lending  stopped.  Yet a focus on banks is justified for two 
reasons.  The first is the high observed  correlation between  exchange-rate 
collapses  and banking  crises.  In the Southern  Cone  of the Americas  in 
the early 1980s, Scandinavia  in the early 1990s, Mexico in 1995, and Asia 
more recently, the currency crashed along with the financial system.  For- 
mal econometric  work, such as that reported by Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1996), shows  that a bank crisis helps  predict a currency crisis.4 The sec- 
ond  is that banks  play  a much  larger role in emerging  than in mature 
economies;  this justifies focusing  on banks to the neglect  of other financ- 
ing mechanisms  such as equity. 
Emphasizing  illiquidity  is  natural  for  emerging  markets  because  of 
their  limited  access  to  world  capital  markets.  When  fractional-reserve 
banks in mature economies  face a liquidity problem,  they are likely to get 
emergency  funds  from  the  world  capital  markets  as  long  as  they  are 
solvent.  This is seldom  the case in emerging  economies:  a private bank 
in Bangkok or Mexico City will get many international  loan offers when 
things  go  well,  and  none  when  it is being  run  on  by  depositors.  The 
combination  of fractional reserve  (and hence  potentially  illiquid) banks 
1. This  is  close  to  what  Dornbusch  (1998) calls  "balance  sheet  vulnerability."  See  also 
Feldstein  (1999) for a set  of policy  recommendations  that focus  on increasing  liquidity. 
2. This point  has been  forcefully  argued by Obstfeld  (1994). 
3. We say  "close to sufficient" because,  as Obstfeld  and Rogoff  (1995) have  stressed,  any 
central bank that has  enough  resources  to buy back the monetary  base  is capable,  in a 
technical  sense,  of  maintaining  an  exchange-rate  peg.  But,  as  Obstfeld  and  Rogoff 
themselves  recognize,  in situations  of financial  distress  the  de  facto claims  on  central- 
bank  reserves  may  be  as large  as  M2 or larger. In those  cases,  as we  study  in detail 
below,  maintaining  the peg becomes  a more treacherous  task. 
4. Also,  Sachs,  Tornell, and  Velasco  (1996b) find  that the  previous  speed  of bank  credit 
growth  helped  explain which  countries  were  affected by the tequila effect. Liquidity  Crises  in Emerging  Markets  ?  13 
and external credit rationing  is potentially  devastating,  and is the focus 
of our analysis below. 
International illiquidity is what the very diverse recent crises in emerg- 
ing markets have  in common.  Recently, troubled  countries  in Asia5 had 
high  and  sharply  rising  ratios  of  hard-currency  short-term  liabilities, 
especially  external debt,  to liquid assets.  They were  therefore extremely 
vulnerable  to what  Calvo  (1998) terms the sudden stop syndrome:  a mas- 
sive  reversal  of  capital  inflows,  which  occurred  in  the  second  half  of 
1997.6 Bankruptcies,  payments  moratoria,  and  collapses  in asset  prices 
(including  the exchange  rate, the price of domestic  money)  proliferated. 
The financial panic fed on itself, causing foreign creditors to call in loans 
and depositors  to withdraw  funds  from banks-all  of which  magnified 
the  illiquidity  of domestic  financial  institutions  and  forced  yet  another 
round of costly  asset liquidation  and price deflation. 
Our intention  is not to provide  yet another answer  to the question  of 
"who  lost  Asia." Nor do we  want  to compete  with  the many  good  and 
detailed  accounts  of what  happened.7  Rather, we  tackle  three  sets  of 
questions: 
Analytics: What is the  right theoretical  framework  for illiquidity-driven 
crises?  We  have  well-established  "first generation"  models  of  how 
loose  money  causes  currency crashes,  and "second  generation"  mod- 
els of why  governments  may choose  to devalue  in response  to mount- 
ing unemployment.  By contrast, models  of crashes caused  by illiquid- 
ity and balance sheet  vulnerability  are still in their infancy.8 
Crisis prevention:  Can illiquidity-driven  crises be avoided,  and how?  The 
easy  yet  useless  answer  is to  require financial  systems  to be  always 
liquid.  Full liquidity  is costly  and  may  dispense  with  all benefits  of 
financial  intermediation:  banks  are in  the  business  of  transforming 
maturities,  and there is no way  to do this without  a mismatched  bal- 
ance  sheet.  Hence,  countries  attempting  to prevent  crises  face some 
unpleasant  trade-offs,  involving  not  only  domestic  financial  regula- 
tion but also monetary, fiscal, and exchange-rate  policy. 
5. Although  our  review  is  restricted  to  the  Asian  crisis,  international  illiquidity  is  also 
found  in  other  crash  episodes.  For instance,  in  Chang  and  Velasco  (1998c) we  have 
argued,  in this respect,  that the recent Asian crisis resembles  the experience  of Chile in 
1982 and Mexico in 1994. 
6. Radelet  and Sachs  (1998) estimate  a capital outflow  of US$ 34 billion  from the Asean-5 
countries  in  the  second  half  of  1997, equivalent  to  a negative  shock  of 3.6% of GDP. 
7. See,  especially,  Corsetti,  Pesenti,  and Roubini (1998a, b) and World Bank (1998). 
8. We have made  some preliminary  progress  in Chang and Velasco (1998a, b, 1999). Other 
papers in the same research line include Calvo (1995, 1998), Detragiache  (1996), Goldfajn 
and Valdes (1997), Jeanne (1998), Aghion,  Bacchetta, and Banerjee (1999), and Krugman 
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Crisis management:  How should  one respond  to a crisis caused by interna- 
tional  illiquidity?  In the  aftermath  of  Asia  there  have  been  furious 
debates  over  the  wisdom  of  increasing  interest  rates  or letting  the 
exchange  rate go  in the  face of an attack. But the  "correct" answers 
should  hinge  on the nature of the crisis. Current-account-driven  crises 
require  a real depreciation  and  a contraction  of  demand;  illiquidity- 
driven crises may call for different answers. 
We study  a model  of a bank situated  in a small  open  economy  with 
limited  access  to  international  capital.  This  simple  setup  attempts  to 
capture  the  main  features  of  what  Krugman  (1998)  has  tentatively 
termed  "third generation"  crisis models,  and enables  us to discuss,  in a 
unified way, a number of issues  raised by the recent sequence  of crises in 
emerging  markets.  In particular, we  discuss  the  role of capital inflows 
and the maturity  of external debt,  the way  in which  real exchange-rate 
depreciation  can  transmit  and  magnify  the  effects  of  bank  illiquidity, 
options  for financial  regulation,  the  role  of  debt  and  deficits,  and  the 
implications  of adopting  different exchange-rate  regimes. 
Clearly  this  is  not  the  only  potentially  useful  way  to  study  crises. 
Several  analysts  of recent  crashes-most  visibly  Corsetti,  Pesenti,  and 
Roubini  (1988a, b)-have  stressed  the  role of bad  shocks  and bad pol- 
icy,  presumably  leading  to  insolvency.  That  emphasis  leads  to  very 
different policy  implications  than does  a model  like ours, which  stresses 
illiquidity  and  multiple  equilibria.  We  can  offer  the  usual  disclaimer: 
both  approaches  are necessary  and may turn out to be complementary. 
But  it  is  important  to  realize  that  in  our  approach  the  line  between 
illiquidity  and  insolvency  is  a fine  one.  Being  illiquid  can  cause  some 
investment  projects  to  be  left  unfinished  and  others  to  be  liquidated 
early.  If this  is  sufficiently  costly,  illiquidity  can  breed  insolvency.  In 
practice,  the  bankruptcies  and  weak  balance  sheets  recently  observed 
in crisis countries  may  well  be  consequences  rather than  causes  of the 
crisis. 
2. International  Illiquidity  in Recent  Crises 
Financial fragility is associated  with the concept of international  illiquidity, 
defined  as a situation  in which  a financial system's  potential  short-term 
liabilities  in hard  currency  exceed  the  amount  of hard  currency  it can 
have  access  to  on  short  notice.  International  illiquidity  was  crucial in 
triggering  recent  crises.  To make  this  case,  we  shall  analyze  data from 
the  so-called  Asean-5  countries  (Korea, Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Thailand, 
and  the  Philippines)  and  also  from  comparable  Latin American  coun- Liquidity  Crises  in Emerging  Markets  ?  15 
tries.9 We need  to answer  at least  two  questions:  how  illiquid were  the 
Asean-5  countries  at the  time  the  crisis  erupted?  And  were  the  Asian 
countries systematically  different from otherwise  similar ones in terms of 
international  illiquidity? Answering  these  questions  requires making the 
concept  of "international illiquidity" operational,  which  in turn requires 
identifying  the institutions  that constitute  each country's  "financial sys- 
tem,"  as well  as their relevant  "short-term assets  and liabilities in hard 
currency." The appropriate  definitions  depend  on government  policy. 
Our  definition  of  a financial  system  will  naturally  include  domestic 
banks and other domestic  financial entities  that perform banklike opera- 
tions  (such  as Thailand's  finance  companies).  In addition,  because  the 
countries under discussion  had governments  committed  to act as lenders 
of last resort of private  financial institutions,  their central banks will be 
included  as well.  This is sensible  because,  in the presence  of such a com- 
mitment,  a crisis affecting private financial institutions  will force a central 
bank to honor it, and this may pull the government  itself into the crisis. 
Indeed,  we  shall argue later that a balance-of-payments  crisis is best un- 
derstood  as a situation  in which  a central bank runs out of international 
liquidity in an attempt to fight a financial crisis. 
Accordingly,  an ideal definition of the liquid international  assets of the 
financial system  would  include not only the short-term external assets of 
private  financial  institutions,  but  also  the  amount  of  foreign  currency 
available to the central bank for last resort lending  in the event of a crisis. 
(Notice  that  the  latter should,  in principle,  exclude  the  amount  of  re- 
serves  that has already been  committed,  implicitly  or explicitly, to other 
uses  in a crisis,  such  as the  repayment  of tesobonos  in Mexico  in 1994.) 
The definition  would  also include  the amount  of international loans that 
the  financial  system  can have  access  to in the  short run as well  as the 
liquidation  value  of fixed assets.  While a measure  of short-term interna- 
tional  liquid  assets  embodying  these  desiderata  can  perhaps  be  con- 
structed,  because  of data constraints  we  use  the  stock  of international 
reserves  of the  monetary  authorities  as a proxy  for the  ideal  measure. 
Similarly, an ideal  definition  of the short-term  international  liabilities 
of the financial system  would  include  its short-term foreign debt as well 
as demandable  deposits  denominated  in foreign currency; the only differ- 
ence,  from the perspective  of international  illiquidity, is that the former 
are obligations  to foreigners  while  the latter are obligations  to domestic 
residents.  In  addition,  if  there  is  a fixed  exchange  rate,  demandable 
deposits  in domestic  currency should  also be included,  since fixed rates 
imply  that such  deposits  are effectively  obligations  in foreign  currency. 
9. The discussion  below  is essentially  taken from Chang and Velasco (1998c). 16 *  CHANG & VELASCO 
The relevant data on deposits in the consolidated financial  system are 
available from the International  Financial  Statistics (IFS),  but the situa- 
tion for international  debt is less satisfactory.  As discussed by Corsetti, 
Pesenti, and Roubini (1998a), the most useful source of evidence on 
short-term  external  debt is published by the Bank  of International  Settle- 
ments (BIS). But the BIS data are restricted to the indebtedness of a 
country's  residents against foreign banks. More importantly  for our pur- 
poses,  available BIS tables are not broken down sufficiently to identify 
the short-term  external debt of the financial system. However, they do 
contain data on  the  short-term external debt (against BIS reporting 
banks) of a country as a whole, as well as on the amount of external  debt 
(including debt of longer maturity)  contracted  by domestic banks. These 
aspects of the data force us to treat domestic deposits and external debt 
separately. 
Keeping data limitations in mind, we now turn to the available evi- 
dence. The data on the Asean-5 countries does suggest that the interna- 
tional liquidity position of their financial  systems deteriorated  before the 
crisis. This is can be seen most clearly  from the BIS  data on foreign  bank 
lending. Table  1 shows the behavior of the ratio of short-term  loans from 
international banks to reserves; obviously, an increase in the ratio im- 
plies a higher likelihood of international  illiquidity.  The upper panel of 
the table shows that among the Asean-5 the ratio increased between 
mid-1994 and mid-1997 in every case except for Indonesia, where the 
ratio was stable. (In Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand the ratio had also 
increased between 1990 and 1994. It had fallen in Indonesia, but not by 
much. It had fallen sharply in the Philippines, but this was probably  an 
anomaly following the Philippine Brady  debt restructuring  of 1991.) 
It is also remarkable  that the ratios  of short-term  debt to reserves at the 
end of 1996  were substantially  above one in Korea,  Indonesia, and Thai- 
land. This suggests a financially  fragile  situation, in the sense that inter- 
national reserves would not have been sufficient to repay the short-term 
debt had foreign banks decided not to roll it over. While the ratio was 
below one in Malaysia  and the Philippines (the two countries among the 
Asean-5 least affected by the crisis), it doubled between mid-1994 and 
mid-1997. 
As shown by the lower panel of Table 1, the corresponding data for 
Latin American countries look rather different. The ratio of short-term 
debt to reserves was stable and below one in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
and Peru;  in Argentina  and Mexico  it was approximately  1.2 in mid-1997, 
thus exceeding one but not by much, and had been falling. The Latin 
countries appear to have been in a much less vulnerable  position. 
The BIS  tables suggest, in addition, that the proportion  of foreign  bank Liquidity  Crises  in Emerging  Markets  ?  17 
Table 1  SHORT-TERM  FOREIGN  DEBT/INTERNATIONAL  RESERVES 
Ratio 
Datea  Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand 
1990  2.21  1.06  0.22  3.18  0.59 
1994  1.73  1.61  0.25  0.41  0.99 
1997  1.70  2.06  0.61  0.85  1.45 
Ratio 
Datea  Argentina  Brazil  Chile  Mexico  Peru 
1990  2.09  2.63  0.89  2.24  3.87 
1994  1.33  0.70  0.51  1.72  0.38 
1997  1.21  0.79  0.45  1.19  0.50 
Source:  BIS, IMF. 
ajune. 
lending  intermediated  by the domestic  banking sector was stable in each 
Asian  case  except  Thailand.  In the  case  of Thailand,  the  decline  in the 
share of the domestic banking sector in foreign borrowing  is attributable, 
by and large, to the increased  importance  of finance companies.  Finance 
companies  seem  to have  emerged  in response  to regulatory distortions, 
but performed banklike functions.  In fact, they are included  in the IFS as 
part  of  the  group  "Other  Banking  Institutions";  the  IFS notes  that 
although  finance companies  were  "not licensed  to accept deposits  from 
the public,"  they  "issued  promissory  notes  at terms  comparable  to the 
time  deposits  at commercial  banks."  The  importance  of  Thailand's  fi- 
nance  companies  in the financial  systems  was  also underscored  by the 
fact that the Bank of Thailand was committed to support them as a lender 
of last resort. 
The evidence  thus strongly indicates that the short-term external liabili- 
ties  of  the  relevant  Asian  financial  systems  were  growing  faster  than 
their liquid international  assets.  In our interpretation,  this trend weak- 
ened  the international  liquidity  position  of the Asean-5  countries  to the 
point  where  a loss  of confidence  from foreign  creditors could  force the 
financial  system  into  a crisis. The same  was  not  true in Latin America. 
The  behavior  of  domestic  deposits  vis-a-vis  international  reserves 
shows  a similar picture. The upper panel of Table 2 shows  the evolution 
of the ratio of M2 to foreign  reserves  for the Asean-5  economies  before 
their crises.  The high  level  of the M2-to-reserves  ratio seems  consistent 
with  the hypothesis  of international  illiquidity. At the end  of 1996, the 
ratio was 6.5 or above in Korea and Indonesia  and 4.5 in the Philippines. 18 *  CHANG & VELASCO 
Table  2  M2 AS A MULTIPLE  OF FOREIGN  RESERVES 
Ratio 
Date  Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand 
1993  6.09  6.91  2.09  4.90  4.05 
1994  6.55  6.45  2.47  4.86  3.84 
1995  7.09  6.11  3.33  5.86  3.69 
1996  6.50  6.51  3.34  4.50  3.90 
Ratio 
Argentina  Brazil  Chile  Mexico  Peru 
1993  3.30  1.85  1.73  4.44  1.91 
1994  3.73  2.30  1.52  12.63  1.27 
1995  3.64  2.22  1.75  4.37  1.31 
1996  3.41  2.75  1.91  4.65  1.24 
Source:  IMF. 
As  the  lower  panel  in  Table 2 reveals,  the  same  ratio was  only  3.4  in 
Argentina,  2.7 in Brazil, and less than 2 in Chile and Peru. It was higher 
in Mexico  (4.65), but there  it had been  falling; it is notable  (and maybe 
more than a coincidence)  that it had been over 7 there in June 1994, just 
before Mexico's own  crisis! 
The M2-to-reserves  ratio was  stable in each of the Asean-5  countries, 
except  in Thailand,  where  it was  falling.  The behavior  of the Thai ratio 
most likely reflects, as we  discussed  above,  that the relevant measure  of 
the liabilities  of Thailand's financial system  vis-a-vis  domestic  residents 
should  include  the  promissory  notes  of the  finance  companies,  which 
are not included  in M2. 
In short, the ratio of M2 to reserves  in the Asean-5  countries had been 
high  in each  case but Thailand.  By contrast,  in comparable  Latin coun- 
tries  the  ratio was  relatively  high  only  in  Mexico,  where  it had  been 
falling drastically. This evidence,  which  proxies  the short-term asset and 
liability positions  of each financial system  vis-a-vis  domestic  depositors, 
also favors  the view  that the Asean-5  but not  the Latin countries  had a 
problem of international  illiquidity when  the crisis started. 
We  conclude  from  this  quick  review  of  the  data  that  international 
illiquidity was in fact a distinguishing  characteristic of the Asean-5 econo- 
mies  prior to their 1997-1998  crises.  Latin countries  did not suffer from 
that condition-and  did not go into crisis.10 
10. In contrast, the performance  of several key real variables was not that different across 
regions.  East Asian  countries  often had large current account deficits in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, but the crash did not happen  until 1997. In the mid 1990s a number of Latin Liquidity  Crises  in Emerging  Markets  ?  19 
Two caveats  are in  order.  First, it bears  repeating  that,  because  the 
Asean-5  countries  had  effectively  fixed  exchange  rates,  our accounting 
includes  domestic  currency deposits  as obligations  in international  cur- 
rency. The magnitudes  of deposits  relative  to international  reserves  im- 
plies that the latter would  not have been sufficient to honor the outstand- 
ing stock of deposits  at the fixed exchange  rate. Given  this condition,  a 
run by domestic  depositors  was bound  to result in either the bankruptcy 
of the financial  system  or the abandonment  of the fixed  exchange  rate. 
The M2-to-reserves  ratio, however,  overstates  international  illiquidity in 
countries  with  flexible  exchange  rates,  such  as Mexico and Peru, to the 
extent that M2 includes  deposits  in domestic  currency. This is because, 
in  case  of  a crisis,  a central  bank  can  always  print  enough  domestic 
currency to honor those  deposits;  see Section 8 below. 
The second  caveat is that, because  comparable  data are not currently 
available,  we  have  not included  short-term domestic  public  debt in our 
liquidity  measures.  In the Asian  crisis, this is not likely to be an impor- 
tant omission.  Around  the time  of the  collapse  there  does  not  seem  to 
have been much short-term public debt in the strongly affected countries 
of Indonesia,  Korea, and Thailand  (see  Table 3 of Ito, 1998). However, 
public debt may have played  a role in other episodes.  We know  that the 
Mexican  government's  inability to roll over its large stock of short-term 
debt (in particular, the infamous  tesobonos)  was to prove key in triggering 
the  financial  crisis  in  December  1994. More  dramatically,  Brazil's debt 
situation  seems  to  be  crucial  for  understanding  its  current  predica- 
ment.11 This raises  the question  of whether  our international-illiquidity 
view  of crises can be reconciled with the presence  of fiscal and/or domes- 
tic debt problems.  We delay our answer until Section 7. 
3. A Basic  Framework 
Focus on a small open economy  with three periods  indexed by t = 0 (the 
planning period), 1 (the short run), and 2 (the long run). There is a single, 
perishable  consumption  good  in each period.  The consumption  good  is 
countries,  including  Brazil, Chile, and Colombia,  had external deficits over 5% of GDP. 
Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand and Brazil surely suffered from real exchange rate misalign- 
ment,  but so did Argentina,  Colombia,  Chile and Peru, and no crisis has yet hit these 
South  American  countries.  For a detailed  discussion,  see  Chang  and Velasco  (1998c). 
11. Except for Brazil, public  debt has  not  been  a major problem  recently  for comparable 
Latin American countries  either. Mexico managed  substantially  to extend  the maturity 
of its public debt after the  1994 collapse.  At the end  of September  1994, its short-term 
domestic  federal debt was  equivalent  to U.S.  $26.1 billion; by the end of June 1997 this 
figure  was  down  to less  than  U.S.  $8.5 billion.  Argentina,  Chile,  and  Peru have  not 
issued  domestic  short-term debt in any substantial  magnitude. 20 *  CHANG & VELASCO 
freely  traded  in  the  world  market; we  take  its  world  price  to  be  the 
numeraire,  or, equivalently,  we  assume  that the price of consumption  is 
fixed at one unit of an international  currency (the dollar). 
The economy  is populated  by a continuum,  whose  measure  is normal- 
ized  to one,  of ex ante identical  individuals,  whom  we refer to as deposi- 
tors for reasons that will become  clear shortly. Each depositor  is endowed 
with  an  amount  a  -  0  of  the  single  good  only  at  t  =  0.  Depositors 
maximize  expected  period-2  consumption. 
They  have  access  to  a world  capital  market where  interest  rates are 
zero. Each depositor  can lend as much as she wants in the world market; 
more precisely,  in each period  she can purchase  any nonnegative  quan- 
tity  of  a world  liquid asset  that  yields  a zero  interest  rate and  can be 
costlessly  liquidated  at any time. In contrast,  each depositor  can borrow 
at most  an amount f  >  0 and  then  only  from a continuum  of identical 
foreign  creditors, whose  measure  is also  unity.  Each foreign  creditor  is 
risk-neutral,  can freely borrow  or lend  in the  world  market,  and maxi- 
mizes expected  second-period  consumption.  Hence creditors will lend to 
domestic  agents  if and only if they are offered an expected  net return of 
zero. 
Domestic  depositors  can also invest in a long-term  asset with the follow- 
ing  characteristics.  Each unit  of the consumption  good  invested  in this 
asset  at t  =  0 yields  R units  of  consumption  at t  =  2.  However,  with 
probability  A, the investment  is hit by a bad shock,  in the sense  that it 
needs  a further  infusion  of  resources  in  period  1 if any  yield  can  be 
collected  in period  2.  The required  infusion  is of size  i <  a + f,  and  is 
independent  of the size  of the initial investment  in the long-term  asset. 
In other words,  when  a long-term  investment  of size k is hit by a shock, 
period-2  output is Rk if and only if an additional  i is invested  in period  1. 
Assume  that R(1 -  A) >  1, that is, the long-term  asset's expected  yield 
is higher  than  the  world  interest  rate even  though  it can  go  to waste 
when  hit  by  a shock.  Assume  also  that  the  long-term  asset  k can  be 
liquidated  at t =  1 for rk units of output  in that period,  where  r C [0, 1).12 
These  assumptions  ensure  that the long-term  asset is very profitable in 
the long  run but illiquid in the short run. 
Information about types is private: whether  an agent is unlucky, in the 
sense  that her long-term  asset is hit by a shock,  is only observed  by that 
agent.  Finally, shocks  to long-term  investment  are i.i.d.  across consum- 
ers and there is no aggregate  uncertainty, so A is also the fraction of the 
domestic  population  that turns out to be unlucky. 
12. Notice  that the investment  has a positive  liquidation  value regardless of whether  it was 
hit by the shock.  Assuming  that only healthy investment  has positive  liquidation value 
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Clearly, in the absence of shocks to illiquid investments,  each domestic 
resident  would  borrow  up  to  her  credit  limit f  and  invest  all  of  her 
resources in the illiquid asset.  On the other hand,  if she knew in advance 
that she  was  unlucky,  she  would  hold  enough  liquidity  to finance  the 
resource infusion  i in period  1.13 
As  the  appendix  shows  in  some  detail,  this  uncertainty  makes  the 
trade-off between  holding  and not holding  sufficient liquidity very unat- 
tractive for the individual  agent.  She can do better by joining  a bank, as 
we now  see. 
3.1 A BANK 
What  banks  do  is  allow  agents  to  take  advantage  of  the  law  of  large 
numbers  to predict more accurately their needs  for costly liquidity. The 
bank pools  the  resources  of the  economy  (including  the  endowment  a 
and the maximum  credit levelfbelonging  to each depositor)  in order to 
maximize  the welfare of its representative  member. In doing  so, it needs 
to respect resource constraints  and informational  constraints.14 
Formally, the  bank's  problem  is  to maximize  expected  consumption 
subject to the following  constraints.  First, it must distribute the period-0 
resources w  a + f to the long-term  asset and the liquid asset, and hence 
it must respect the budget  constraint 
k + b _ w,  (1) 
where  b and k denote,  respectively,  investment  in the liquid and illiquid 
assets.  In period  1, the bank may or may not spend  i to shore up each of 
the A  investments  hit by a shock. In period 2 the bank collects the result of 
its investments,  repays the external debtf,  and pays c to each depositor.15 
Finally, these  choices  must  satisfy  the incentive  compatibility  constraint 
i -  c.  (2) 
An explanation  of this last inequality  is in order. To simplify  exposition, 
we  assume  that unlucky  agents  cannot lie about their types.  In contrast, 
a lucky agent can claim to have been hit by a bad shock,  obtain i from the 
13. Hence  shocks  to long-term  investment  play here a role analogous  to preference  shocks 
in models  in the tradition of Diamond  and Dybvig  (1983). 
14. In this  subsection  we  characterize  the best  that the bank can do  for its members;  the 
next subsection  deals with  whether  and how  this solution  can be decentralized. 
15. This  is without  loss  of  generality,  although  in principle  the  bank  may  pay  different 
amounts  to lucky  and unlucky  agents.  With risk neutrality, this would  not  make any 
difference.  As long as there is even a small degree of risk aversion,  however,  it becomes 
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bank, and abscond  with  the payment.  In that case,  she cannot be caught, 
but is entitled  to no  period-2  consumption.16  To prevent  absconding,  c 
cannot be smaller than i. 
To characterize  the  solution  (whose  values  are denoted  by hats),  ig- 
nore the incentive  constraints  for the moment.  It can be shown  that the 
bank will hold  enough  liquidity  to shore  up bad investments,17  that is, 
b=,i,  (3) 
which  implies  that consumption  in period  2 is 
e = Rk +  (b -  Ai)-f=  R(w -  Ai) -f.  (4) 
[It is easy  to show  that the equality  in (3) must  hold.]  Note  that e is not 
only  the  total  consumption  in period  2 but  also  the  expected  utility  of 
depositors. 
One still has to check that the incentive  constraint  e  -  i is satisfied,  or 
Rw-f  i  ,  (5) 
1 + RA 
which  we  assume  from here on. 
One  can now  check that e is greater than optimal  consumption  under 
individual  autarky  (the  latter  is  derived  in  the  Appendix).  The  bank 
improves  matters  over  autarky;  the  reason  is  that  the  bank  faces  no 
uncertainty, and hence  may plan to hold less liquidity than an individual 
in isolation.18 
The  optimal  bank  allocation  differs  from  the  autarky  solution  along 
several  other dimensions.  In particular, since the current account deficit 
in  period  0  is  given  by  k  -  a and  the  amount  k devoted  to  illiquid 
investments  is larger under  a bank,  it follows  that financial intermedia- 
tion enlarges  that deficit. It also changes  the net foreign asset position  of 
the  economy  as a whole.  In period  1, the  net  foreign  asset  position  is 
given by b -  f; since financial intermediation  reduces  the amount  b held 
16. Lucky  agents cannot, however, withdraw i in period 1 and c in period 2. The implicit 
assumption  is that types become public information  at the beginning of period 2. 
17. If it were optimal for the bank to plan not to shore up bad investments, it would be 
optimal to set b = 0. Total consumption  in period 2 (and also ex ante utility) would  then 
be given  by  [(1 -  A)R +  Ar]w -  f.  But assumption  (32) in the Appendix  (necessary  so 
that agents  in autarky choose  to be liquid) implies that this is less than t as given by (4). 
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abroad,  the  net  foreign  asset  position  is  smaller  with  a bank  than  in 
autarky.  19 
3.2 DEMAND  DEPOSITS  AND ILLIQUIDITY 
The previous  subsection  identified  the best  allocation  that the coalition 
of depositors  can achieve  in principle.  In practice, the bank may rely on 
alternative systems  to attempt implementing  the social optimum.  Follow- 
ing  much  of the  literature,  the  rest of the paper  is concerned  with  the 
study  of one  such  system,  which  we  call demand deposits. Our focus  on 
demand  deposits  makes sense  not only because  they are often observed 
in reality, but also because,  as we  shall see,  they  are able to implement 
the social optimum. 
Given  the  optimal  allocation  (c,k,b), a  demand-deposit  system  is  a 
contract that works  as follows.  Each depositor  agrees  to surrender  her 
endowment  and her borrowing  capacity to the bank at time 0. In period 
1 she  may withdraw  i from the bank on demand,  so that she can shore 
up her illiquid  investment  if necessary.  (This resembles  actual demand 
deposits  in that depositors  may withdraw  i at their discretion).  In period 
2,  depositors  have  the  right  to  withdraw  0, provided  they  have  not 
absconded. 
To finance  its operations,  the bank borrows f in period  0, invests  k in 
the  long-term  asset,  and  invests  b in  the  world  liquid  asset.  We shall 
assume,  for the  time being,  that foreign  debt  contracted  in period  0 is 
due  for repayment  in period  2 at a contractual interest  rate of zero; the 
significance  of this assumption  will be discussed  at the beginning  of the 
next subsection.  The bank agrees to use  b =  Ai to finance period-1 with- 
drawals,  and  Rk =  R(w  -  Ai) to  repay  the  external  debt  and  service 
withdrawals  in period  2. 
We impose  two additional  assumptions  on this system.  First, in period 
1 the bank must  serve  depositors  on a first-come,  first-served  basis.20 In 
period  1 depositors  visit  the bank in random  order. Upon  arrival at the 
bank, and assuming  the bank is open,  each depositor  may withdraw  i on 
demand.  To service  withdrawals,  the  bank  liquidates  its world  asset  b 
until  exhausted,  and  then  it  proceeds  to  liquidate  long-term  invest- 
ments.  If all assets  are  liquidated  while  there  are agents  still  in  line 
attempting  to withdraw,  the bank goes  bankrupt  and closes.  Second,  if 
the bank did not close in period 1, in period 2 output  (if any) is collected, 
depositors  and foreign creditors are paid,  and any surplus  is distributed 
19. These assertions  follow from  the Appendix. 
20. Wallace  (1996)  derives this sequential  service  constraint  from  more primitive  assumptions 
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to  depositors.  We shall  assume  that,  in period  2,  the bank  serves  first 
those  depositors  that did not withdraw  i in period  1.21 
In the demand  deposit  system  just described,  depositors  face a strate- 
gic decision  of how  and when  to withdraw.  In other words,  depositors 
are engaged  in an anonymous  game,  whose  equilibria naturally charac- 
terize  the outcomes  of the system.  We are now  ready  to describe  those 
outcomes. 
A first result is that the demand  deposit  system  has an honest equilib- 
rium, in which  all depositors  withdraw  according to their true types,  the 
bank honors  all of its commitments  to foreign creditors,  and the socially 
optimal  allocation  is obtained.  The intuition  is simple.  By construction, 
the  demand  deposit  system  is feasible  if depositors  act honestly.  Then 
the  incentive  compatibility  constraints  ensure  that  lying  about  shocks 
and absconding  cannot be profitable for lucky depositors. 
The previous  result implies that the demand  deposit system can decen- 
tralize  the preferred  allocation.  But this is not  the  only  possibility.  The 
problem is that, because  holding  liquidity  is costly, the bank may choose 
to become  illiquid  in  the  short  run  (i.e.  in period  1) in  the  sense  that 
b+rk <  i.  (6) 
This  international illiquidity condition  says  that  the  potential short-term 
obligations  of the  bank  may  exceed  its liquidation  value.  International 
illiquidity  is  crucial,  since  it is  necessary  and  sufficient  for a bank-run 
equilibrium to exist. 
To see that international  illiquidity is a sufficient condition  for the exis- 
tence of a bank-run equilibrium,  observe that a bank run occurs when  all 
depositors  withdraw  i and lucky ones  abscond.  Given  (6), this behavior 
will  force the bank to liquidate  all assets  and  close.  As  a consequence, 
depositors  will not be paid anything in period 2, which in turn implies that 
it is individually  optimal for each of them to run on the bank. Conversely, 
if (6) fails, then the bank will not exhaust  its resources  even  if all deposi- 
tors collect i in period 1. This, together with the assumption  about senior- 
ity of claims, implies  that lucky depositors  that wait until period 2 will be 
able to collect at least the promised  2 from the bank. But then it cannot be 
individually  optimal for them to participate in a run.22 
21. For instance,  suppose  that  in period  1 each  depositor  can either  stand  in line  at the 
bank or walk to the next day's line and wait there. 
22. A formal proof is as follows.  Let Ar  be the fraction of depositors  reporting bad luck; in a 
run, Ar >  A. The bank will be forced to liquidate I = (Ar  -  A)i/r units of k in period  1. The 
bank will be able to repay e to the 1 -  Ar  depositors  that wait if R(k -  1) >  (1 -  Ar), or if 
Rk >  R(Ar  -  A)i/r +  (1 -  Ar). But this must be the case if (6) fails. Liquidity  Crises in Emerging  Markets *  25 
Since (6) is equivalent to 
[1 -  A(1 -  r)]i 
r  C 
w 
a bank run will be possible if and only if liquidation of the long-term 
asset is sufficiently costly. 
In short, a demand-deposit system may emerge in this economy as a 
collective attempt to implement the social optimum. The system may 
succeed in this purpose if every depositor believes that all others will 
behave honestly. However, the system may also fail: self-fulfilling  bank 
runs are possible because the social optimum may imply international 
illiquidity. 
As we argued at the outset, in this model illiquidity  and insolvency are 
closely related. We have stressed that a certain  illiquidity  condition must 
be satisfied for run to occur. But in that case the runs are self-fulfilling 
precisely because they lead to insolvency. Bank  creditors  who do not run 
(or who  cannot run, like external creditors) get nothing in period 2 
because all bank assets have been liquidated. And it is precisely the 
costly nature of this liquidation  that turns an illiquid  bank into an insol- 
vent one. 
3.3  THE PROBABILITY  OF CRISES 
In  the  preceding  subsection  we  ignored  the  fact  that,  if  a bank  run 
occurs,  the external debt contracted  in period  0 is defaulted  on.  This is 
consistent  with  our earlier assumption  of zero interest  rates on foreign 
borrowing  only  if foreign  creditors  believe,  at t  =  0,  that  a crisis will 
occur  with  zero  probability.  The  analysis  of  the  previous  section  may 
need  to be modified  if creditors are rational and crises occur with  posi- 
tive probability when  they are possible.  More generally, while  we  stated 
that  runs  may  take  place,  we  did  not  discuss  the  probability  of  such 
runs,  nor  the  effects  that  such  a probability  may  have  on  the  bank's 
problem.23 
How  to deal with  this issue  is controversial; our strategy follows  Coo- 
per and  Ross  (1998). We postulate  the existence  of a publicly  observed 
random  variable  that takes  the  value  1 with  probability  p E  [0,1] or 0 
with  probability  1 -  p. The nature  of that random  variable is arbitrary 
but immaterial,  as long  as depositors  and creditors may condition  their 
23. In this subsection  we keep the assumption  that all foreign debt contracted in period 0 is 
due  in  period  2.  This  is  only  to  simplify  the  exposition,  but  in  fact the  distinction 
between  short-term and long-term  debt has been  crucial in recent crises. We deal with 
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behavior  on  its realization;  however,  we  assume  that payments  prom- 
ised  at t =  0 cannot be made  contingent  on it. We also assume  that p is 
sufficiently  small so that R(1 -  A)(1 -  p) >  1. Otherwise,  the long-term 
asset  is insufficiently  productive  (in an expected-value  sense),  and it is 
optimal  to invest  everything  in the liquid world  asset. 
The bank's problem is now  to choose  an allocation (c, k, b) to maximize 
the  expected  utility  of its representative  depositor,  taking  into  account 
the following  observations.  First, the allocation must be feasible  if there 
is no crisis. Second,  the allocation will determine  whether  or not a crisis 
can occur. The results  of the previous  section  imply  that a given  alloca- 
tion may result in a crisis if and only if 
i >  b +  rk,  (7) 
in which  case we  assume  that a bank run occurs with probability p. 
Second,  if a bank run occurs, not every depositor will collect what she is 
owed  by the bank.  Our assumptions  imply  that in a run each depositor 
will be served  (and thus be able to withdraw  i) with probability (b + rk)/i.24 
Finally, if a bank run occurs,  foreign  loans  contracted in period  0 will 
be defaulted  on. This implies  that foreign creditors will demand  an inter- 
est rate greater than zero on these  loans  in order to compensate  for the 
probability of default.  Denoting  the interest rate on two-period  loans  to 
the bank by r,, it is readily seen  that 
=  p/(l  -  p)  if (7) holds, 
1  0  if not.  (8) 
In this simple  model,  the solution  of the resulting  problem is straight- 
forward if p is small enough.  If an allocation  satisfies  b =  b =  Ai (so that 
bad  investments  can be  shored  up)  and  (7) (so that a run is possible), 
period-2  total consumption  conditional  on no run taking place is 
pf 
R(w -  i) -  (1 + rl)f =  c-  ,  (9) 
1-p 
and hence  the expected  utility of such an allocation is 
/  pf  \  f  b +  rk \ 
c  =  (1  -  P)  +p  i  0) 
= (1 -  p)c + p(b + rkf).  (11) 
24. This follows  because  only a fraction (b + rk)/i  of all depositors  will be served.  Hence  the 
probability  that  a  particular  depositor  will  be  served  equals  the  probability  that  a 
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Note  that c* converges  to e as p goes  to zero,  as should  be expected. 
On  the  other  hand,  runs  will  not  occur if the  inequality  in (7) is re- 
versed.  This requires holding  liquid assets  at least as large as 
i -  rw 
b**  .  (12) 
1 -r 
Since b**  >  Ai for r small enough,  the expected  utility of such a runproof 
allocation is 
c** = Rw -  (R -  )b** -  Ai -f. 
Therefore,  the bank will choose  the socially  optimal  levels  (b, k), and 
promise  a last-period  payment  of c -  pf/(l  -  p) to depositors,  leaving 
itself  vulnerable  to a run,  if c* >  c**. This requires  the probability  of a 
crisis to be less than 
{i[1 -  (1 - r)A]-  rw}(R-  1)  (13)  p*  =  .  (13) 
(1 -  r)[(R  -  r)(w  -  Ai) -  Ai] 
A run will occur with probability p if and only if p <  p*. 
It follows  that the analysis  of the previous  subsection  remains  essen- 
tially valid if p is small enough.  In this simple  model,  in fact, the bank's 
investment  decisions  will be exactly the  same  as with  p =  0; hence,  for 
the analysis  of many  questions  it is legitimate  to proceed  as if p were  in 
fact zero. On the other hand,  allowing  p to be positive  will turn out to be 
informative  in the analysis  of some  issues,  such  as the determination  of 
asset  prices  and  the  structure  of  interest  rates.  We will  exploit  these 
degrees  of freedom  in the exposition  that follows.  It is to be understood 
that results  obtained  with  p =  0 will carry over to the case in which  p is 
small but strictly positive. 
3.4 WHY  THIS  MODEL? 
We now  have a simple  framework with  some  desirable attributes: 
Holding  liquidity  is costly, and international  illiquidity emerges  endoge- 
nously  as the  optimal  response  of agents  to their  environment.  The 
consequence  is that bad equilibria caused  by self-fulfilling  pessimistic 
expectations  are possible. 
Financial institutions  may choose  to leave  themselves  illiquid and there- 
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bility.  This  does  not  imply  that  illiquidity  and  crises  are always  an 
inevitable  outcome  of an optimal  plan: as we  show  below,  distortions 
can affect allocations  and hence  vulnerability  to crises. 
Domestic  banks  have  two  types  of  creditors:  domestic  depositors  and 
foreign lenders.  The interaction between  them can give rise to a rich set 
of outcomes,  with the size and maturity of loans from abroad mattering 
a great deal. This is particularly important in light of the recent Asian 
experience,  in which  capital inflows  were  large before the crisis and a 
run by foreign creditors triggered much (but not all) the trouble faced by 
domestic  banks. 
Crises  have  real  effects,  in  contrast  with  first- and  second-generation 
models.  Costly  liquidation  (or, more  generally,  projects  that  are left 
unfinished  or not  undertaken  because  of lack of funding)  can cause 
illiquid banks to suffer real losses  and become  de facto insolvent. 
Government's  policy  can  matter  here  in  two  ways.  First,  policy  can 
conceivably  help  agents  relax some  of  the  constraints  placed  by  the 
environment-for  instance,  by using  the government's  power  to tax 
and  borrow,  making  resources  available  to  the  bank  when  they  are 
needed  most.  Second,  policy can attempt to offset distortions  that lead 
to too much borrowing  or too little liquidity, if any exist. 
Next  we  put  this  model  to  work  for  the  analysis  of  several  issues 
related to emerging  markets crises. 
4.  Debt  Maturity  and  Capital  Flows 
Most  accounts  of  the  Asian  crisis  stress  the  role  of  short-term  debt.25 
Countries  affected  were  peculiar  in that their foreign  debts were  mostly 
of short  maturity, and crises  occurred when  foreign  creditors  panicked 
and  refused  to  roll  over  their  short-term  loans.26 Furman  and  Stiglitz 
(1998) write: "The ability of this variable, by itself, to predict the crises of 
1997, is remarkable." 
Banks and  governments  in emerging  markets  often  explain  that they 
prefer to borrow short-term "because it is cheaper." This sounds  sensible 
enough.  But the  term  structure  of  interest  rates  is  determined  by  the 
riskiness  of different debt maturities,  and these should  in turn reflect the 
possibility  of  a crisis  associated  with  illiquid  portfolios.  Consequently, 
the role of short-term debt in generating  a crisis can only be analyzed  in 
25. Among them Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998a),  Radelet and Sachs (1998), and 
Furman  and Stiglitz (1998). 
26. For arguments of this sort in the context of the Asian crisis, see Radelet and Sachs 
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a model  of the simultaneous determination  of debt maturity and the term 
structure  of interest  rates.  In this  section  we  propose  one  such  model 
and derive its policy  implications.27 
4.1 THE  TERM  STRUCTURE  OF INTEREST  RATES 
Consider  the  model  of the  previous  section,  now  allowing  the bank to 
take  both  short-  and  long-term  debt.  Let  d, be  the  amount  the  bank 
borrows  for two  periods  starting in period  0, and ds the amount  it bor- 
rows  in period  0 to be repaid with  interest in period  1; of course,  under 
appropriate  conditions  this loan can be rolled over in period  1. The two 
amounts  must satisfy the credit ceiling 
d, + dd,  f.  (14) 
We know  from (8) what the contractual return is on two-period  loans. 
What  about  rs, the  contractual  return  one-period  loans?  If the  loan  is 
renewed  in period  1, the net  interest  rate must be zero.  But starting in 
period  0 for loans  repayable  in period  1, two  cases  are possible.  If the 
bank chooses  an allocation  in which  a run is not possible,  there is zero 
probability  of default  and  r, must  be  zero.  But if the  allocation  is such 
that a run may happen,  lenders  may not receive  full payment,  and this 
will  be  reflected  in the  interest  premium  they  charge.  The seniority  of 
claims in the event  of a run will determine  the size of this premium.  For 
the  sake  of brevity,  we  study  here  only  the  simplest  case  in which  all 
short-term  claims  are equally  senior  in period  1: in the  event  of a run, 
domestic  depositors  and foreign  creditors  all "get in line" at the bank, 
with  their place in line being  determined  randomly. 
Given any allocation, total liquid resources  available to the bank in the 
event  of a run equal  b +  rk. A straightforward  extension  of the analysis 
of the previous  section  implies  that a run is possible  if and only if 
i +  (1 + rs)ds  >  b + rk,  (15) 
which  is the appropriate international  illiquidity condition.28 
If a run is possible,  it will happen  with probability p, and in that case 
each short-term  creditor will collect the promised  repayment  only  with 
probability 
27. This section  largely follows  Chang  and Velasco (1999), except  for the analysis  of exter- 
nalities,  which  is new.  Obstfeld  (1994) has  also discussed  the role of debt maturity  in 
generating  self-fulfilling  crises, although  he did not endogenize  the choice of maturity. 
28. For the  "only if" part, we  modify  the seniority  assumption  of Section 3.2 in a natural 
way: if the bank is alive in period  2, it honors  first the claims of those  depositors  and 
foreign short-term creditors that did not collect in period  1. 30 *  CHANG & VELASCO 
b +  rk 
q =  .  (16) 
(1 +  rJ)d,  +  i 
Since  creditors  are  risk-neutral  and  have  a  zero  opportunity  cost  of 
funds,  rs will  be  determined  by  the  condition  that  the  expected  net 
return on a short loan is zero.  That is, 
(1 +  rs)(l -  p + pq) =  1.  (17) 
This implies  that if a crisis is possible,  r, < p/(l  -  p) = r,. Hence  a term 
structure of interest  rates emerges  endogenously,  and in this term struc- 
ture  short-term  debt  is  less  expensive  (in  the  contractual  sense)  than 
long-term  debt.  The intuition  is that in the event  of a crisis, the default 
on long-term  debt is complete,  while  under our assumptions  short-term 
debt will be at least partly honored. 
4.2 ENDOGENOUS  MATURITY  STRUCTURE 
The bank's  problem  is now  to choose  its investment  portfolio  and  the 
optimal  maturity  structure of its foreign  debt in order to maximize  the 
welfare  of its representative  depositor.  The analysis  of this problem  re- 
duces  to that of two  simpler  subproblems.  First, suppose  that the bank 
had to solve  the above problem  respecting  the additional  constraint that 
no crises can be possible.  Then the constraint i + ds,  b + rk would  have 
to  be  respected.  Since  it  is  easy  to  see  that  the  implicit  cost  of  that 
constraint is minimized  by setting  d, = 0, the value  of such subproblem 
would  just  be  given  by  c**, as  derived  in  Section  3.3.  Note  that  the 
subproblem,  and hence  c**, do not depend  on p. 
Alternatively, suppose  that the bank had to choose an allocation consis- 
tent  with  crises.  In that  case,  it can be  shown  that it is optimal  to set 
again  b =  b =  Ai, and  k =  w  -  Ai. If no  crises  occurs,  therefore,  total 
period-2  consumption  will be given  by Rk -  (1 +  rs)d, -  (1 +  rl)(f -  ds). 
Hence  the value  of this subproblem  is 
c = max  (1 -  p) [Rk -  (1 + rs)d -  (1 + r,)(f-  d,)] + pqi  (18) 
ds 
subject to (16) and (17). 
Clearly the overall bank's  problem  can now  be solved  by solving  the 
above  two  subproblems  and  comparing  their values.  This implies  that 
the value  of the bank's problem  is given  by the maximum  of c and c**. 
But c must  be  at least  as large as c* as derived  in Section  3.3; hence  it 
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small the best allocation will be such that a crisis is possible,  and we shall 
focus  on that case. 
What is the optimal level of short-term debt when  the bank chooses  to 
make itself vulnerable?  In this simple  model  with linear preferences  and 
technology,  the answer  is simple  (in fact, too  simple):  c turns out to be 
the  same  for  all  ds in  [0, f],  and  hence  the  optimal  debt  structure  is 
indeterminate.29 The intuition  is that, while  short-term debt is contractu- 
ally less expensive  than long-term  debt, the cost difference only compen- 
sates  foreign  creditors  for the  partial  defaults  associated  with  the  two 
kinds  of  debt.  As  a consequence,  the  choice  between  short-term  debt 
and long-term  debt is immaterial  for final consumption,  which  coupled 
with  risk neutrality  explains  the result. 
However,  if the model  is amended  so that domestic  residents  are even 
mildly  risk-averse,  optimal  debt  maturity  is pinned  down:  we  show  in 
the Appendix  that the bank will find it strictly optimal to set ds =  0. The 
intuition  is  that,  while  the  choice  between  short-  and  long-term  debt 
does  not affect expected  consumption,  it changes  the allocation  of risk. 
Taking short-term debt increases expected  consumption  conditional  on a 
crisis  not  happening,  at the  expense  of  reducing  the  probability  that 
domestic  depositors  will be served when  a crisis happens.  This is cannot 
be optimal  if depositors  are risk-averse. 
It follows  that, in this model,  short-term borrowing  is indeed  subopti- 
mal.  How  can one  reconcile  this result with  the  observed  bias towards 
short-term borrowing  emphasized  in the recent literature? One possibil- 
ity is that the bias reflects some  distortion  not captured by our assump- 
tions.  We discuss  this next. 
4.3 MARKET  FAILURE 
There may be many  reasons  why  debt choices  by individual  borrowers 
might be distorted,  so that private and social incentives  do not coincide. 
One of them is that individual  borrowers fail to take into account the fall 
in country risk ratings that may result from their own higher borrowing. 
A  related  reason  is  that,  because  of  informational  limitations,  foreign 
lenders  cannot distinguish  across borrowers  from the same country, and 
treat them  all as  equally  risky.  Indeed,  the  policy  of  sovereign ceilings 
followed  by  rating  agencies,  in which  no  single  company  can  have  a 
rating higher than the government  of its country, suggests  that this may 
well be so.30 
To illustrate,  consider  a simple  case  in  which  the  short  maturity  of 
29. The determination  of c and of the optimal debt maturity  is analyzed in the Appendix.  30. See Furman  and Stiglitz  (1998)  for additional  reasons  as well as an extended discussion. 32 *  CHANG & VELASCO 
foreign  debt  is  due  to  the  fact that banks  fail to  internalize  the  social 
effects  of  reducing  their  liquidity.  Suppose  that  there  are not  one  but 
many  banks,  each of which  solves  the same problem  as in the previous 
subsection  but with  one  crucial difference:  each bank takes the interest 
rate r, [instead of the arbitrage condition  (17)] as given in its optimization 
problem.  Of course,  (17) must hold  in equilibrium.31 
In the Appendix  we  show  that, under  our benchmark  assumption  of 
risk neutrality, equilibrium  requires that d, = f-that  is,  all debt is to be 
short-term. The intuition  is, obviously,  that if banks are indifferent  as to 
debt maturity structure when  they correctly evaluated  the cost of short- 
term borrowing,  they  must  strictly prefer short-term  to long-term  debt 
when  that cost is underestimated. 
This result  is extreme  due  to risk neutrality, but the point  is general: 
the prevalence  of short-term borrowing  may be reflecting an externality 
of the kind just discussed.  If that is in fact the case, government  interven- 
tion  to discourage  short-term borrowing  is justified.32 Our analysis  im- 
plies, however,  that while  optimal intervention  would  reduce short-term 
borrowing,  it would  not eliminate  the possibility  of crises: if policy  were 
successful  in eliminating  the  effect  of the externality  discussed  here,  it 
might  be  still  optimal  for  banks  to  choose  an  internationally  illiquid 
allocation and be subject to crises. 
4.4 POLICY  IMPLICATIONS:  CRISIS  PREVENTION 
Given  that short-term  debt is a potential  cause  of liquidity  problems,  if 
there is too much of it because of the kind of market failure just discussed, 
there may be a case for policies  that lengthen  the maturity of that debt. A 
natural candidate  is a tax on short-term capital inflows,  such as that used 
by Chile  and  Colombia.  Soto  and  Valdes-Prieto  (1996), Larrain, Laban, 
and  Chumacero  (1997), Cardenas  and  Barrera (1997), and  Montiel  and 
Reinhart (1997) estimate that a shift in composition  toward longer foreign- 
debt maturities is precisely  what the taxes seem  to have accomplished  in 
both countries.  But such a conclusion  is subject to two important caveats. 
In our model,  as in the real world,  short-term debt serves  some  useful 
functions.  Here,  it  serves  to  share  some  of  the  risk  of  runs  between 
domestic  and foreign  creditors,  and hence  lower  the contractual cost of 
borrowing.  The same would  be true in a world with stochastic shocks  to 
31. More precisely, an equilibrium  of this model is given by an allocation and a short 
interest rate such that (i) the allocation  is optimal for each bank when it takes interest 
rates as given, and (ii) the allocation and the short-term interest rate satisfy the 
arbitrage  condition (17). 
32. In this model, however, the externality  causes no distortion and there is no welfare 
loss. This  is clearly  a consequence  of our strong assumptions;  in general,  the extemality 
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exogenous  variables.  Alternatively,  short-term debt may serve as a com- 
mitment  device,  as  in  the  models  of  Jeanne  (1998)  and  Rodrik  and 
Velasco (1999). Policies that effectively  prohibit short-term  debt,  regard- 
less  of circumstance,  need  not enhance  social welfare. 
The  other  very  important  caveat  is  that  foreigners  are not  the  only 
short-term creditors. Hence,  abolishing  short-term debt is neither neces- 
sary nor sufficient for ruling out crises. As Krugman (1998) has stressed, 
that  still  leaves  all holders  of  domestic  claims  on  the  commercial  and 
central banks  ready  to run.  Policies  other  than  limits  on  short-term  in- 
flows  are necessary  to deal with this problem. We examine  some of those 
policies  below. 
4.5 POLICY  IMPLICATIONS:  CRISIS  MANAGEMENT 
Short-term  debt  makes  a coordination  failure among  lenders  possible.  A 
main task of crisis management  is to attempt to coordinate their behavior 
on  the  good  outcome.  Of course,  that is easier  said  than  done.  In this 
model,  the key is to avoid the real costs (liquidation and others) imposed 
by early repayment.  Hence,  a simple  suspension  of payments  that pre- 
serves  the present  value  of the creditors' claims makes  everyone  better 
off.  This kind  of logic  leads  Kenen  (1998) to wonder  whether  in recent 
policy  debates  "there has been too much talk of the need  for permanent 
debt  workouts  as distinct  from short-term  suspensions  of debt  service 
payments." 
In practice  lenders  are wary  of  such  responses.  From New  York or 
London  it is hard to distinguish  the payments  moratoria that are justi- 
fied  by  liquidity  considerations  from  those  that  are veiled  attempts  at 
default.  When  in doubt,  bankers are likely to suspect  the latter. There is 
also the logistical problem of coordinating  the actions of many bondhold- 
ers (the norm for most  capital flows  today) rather than a few banks. 
But the  fact that the task is hard should  not  keep  policymakers  from 
trying.  Payments  reprogrammings  that  are  accompanied  by  serious 
macroeconomic  policies  and signals of orthodoxy  (such as fiscal retrench- 
ment) may prove more palatable. In Korea, for instance,  American,  Euro- 
pean,  and Japanese banks jointly agreed in December  1997 to an orderly 
rollover of existing  short-term loans.  Major creditor countries helped  by 
anticipating  the  disbursement  of  a fraction  of  the  bailout  package  the 
IMP had just approved.  Those two measures  effectively  ended  the finan- 
cial panic that had gripped  Korea for several months.33 
In our model,  a good part of the problem comes from the bank's inabil- 
33. This description  follows  Corseti,  Pesenti,  and Roubini (1998b). They also note that the 
rescheduling  of loans was  a much more daunting  task in Indonesia,  where  there were 
large numbers  both on the lenders'  and on the borrowers'  side. 34 *  CHANG & VELASCO 
ity to sell rather than liquidate its illiquid assets in the event  of a squeeze. 
That assumption  is realistic insofar as, in a crisis situation,  there are few 
domestic  agents with the cash in hand to buy the real capital. But foreign- 
ers are in a different  position.  Everyone  would  be better off if through 
foreign direct investment  liquidation could be avoided-even  if the price 
is  that  of  a fire sale,  below  the  present  value  of  capital's  real yield  in 
the future.34 Hence,  foreign  direct investment  should  be encouraged  for 
these  purposes.  Debt-equity  swaps  involving  foreign creditors played  a 
role in the resolution  of the 1980s debt crisis, and could be useful again in 
the current context. 
Multilateral lenders  can also help.  T hey can lend  "into arrears" when 
appropriate  to strengthen  confidence  in the borrower's  prospects.  They 
can also  encourage  the adoption  of clauses  in international  bond  cove- 
nants  that  facilitate  negotiations  between  debtors  and  creditors  even 
when  debt service  is suspended.  As Kenen  (1999) points  out,  such pro- 
posals  were  endorsed  by  the  G-10  back  in  1995,  but  have  yet  to  be 
implemented  in full. 
5.  Bank  Regulation 
In this section  we  study  how  changes  in regulation  or in the availability 
of deposit  insurance  can affect the banks' vulnerability  to runs. 
5.1. FINANCIAL  LIBERALIZATION 
Both casual  observation  of  recent  crises  and  formal  econometric  work 
suggest  the existence  of important  links between  financial  liberalization 
and crises. The econometric  work of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) and 
Demirguc-Kent  and Detragiache  (1998) has shown  that financial liberal- 
ization  precedes  financial  crises.  Similar  stylized  facts  have  emerged 
from case studies  of many  notorious  crisis episodes,  including  Chile in 
1982, Sweden  and  Finland  in 1992, Mexico in 1994, and Asia in 1997.35 
Lowering  reserve  requirements  on  commercial  banks  is  a  common 
liberalization  move.  Mexico,  for instance,  lowered  required reserves  on 
peso  sight  deposits  all the way  to zero in the first half of the 1990s. The 
rationale is usually  that such reductions  enhance  the efficiency  of finan- 
cial intermediation.  Our analysis  implies  that the conjecture  is correct, 
34. Because the world  rate of interest is zero and one  unit of healthy  capital yields  R units 
of the tradeable good  in period  2, the "fundamental"  price is R. But any price smaller 
than R and bigger  than r makes  the bank and its creditors better off, while  giving  the 
foreign  investor  an abnormally  high rate of return. 
35. See Velasco (1987, 1992), Dombusch,  Goldfajn,  and Valdes (1995), Sachs,  Tomell,  and 
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but  also  that there is a side  effect: lower  reserve  requirements  increase 
banks' vulnerability  to runs. 
To fix ideas,  assume  thatf  =  0, and consider  a polar policy  of narrow 
banking, in which  intermediaries  are required to keep liquid assets  in an 
amount equal to potential  liquid liabilities: b -  i. Clearly, no self-fulfilling 
runs  can  take  place.  But,  at the  same  time,  there  is  a loss  in welfare 
relative  to  the  no-run  equilibrium.  In fact,  in  this  very  simple  model, 
narrow banking  is equivalent  to autarky; requiring it does  away with  all 
the  benefits  of  financial  intermediation  (this  is  not  necessarily  true  in 
more complex  models-see  Chang and Velasco, 1998b). This captures in 
a nutshell  a result  that  turns  up  several  times  throughout  this  paper: 
making  yourself  liquid  is easy, but it is also potentially  expensive.  Not 
any policy to enhance  liquidity will do. 
Another  popular  liberalization policy  is to lower barriers to entry into 
the banking  sector (whether  by domestic  or by foreign banks),  presum- 
ably enhancing  competition  and  efficiency.  But the problem  is that the 
additional  competition  may also encourage  greater risktaking by banks. 
Typically the argument  is phrased  in terms of "franchise values,"  which 
presumably  fall with  competition,  so  that banks  have  less  to  lose  and 
therefore  behave  less  prudently.  Garber  (1996),  for  instance,  writes: 
"...  the  sudden  admission  of foreign  banking  competition  into  a sys- 
tem with  low  capital can further reduce the franchise value  of domestic 
banks and lead to a crisis within  a few years as domestic  banks compete 
to retain market share." 
Models  like the one in this paper can deliver similar results.  While we 
have treated the bank as a coalition of individual  agents bent on maximiz- 
ing their joint welfare,  an alternative  interpretation  of our model  is that 
the bank is a perfect competitor  in a banking market into which  there are 
no  barriers to  entry. Free entry  would  ensure  that  equilibrium  profits 
were  zero,  and  in  order  to  attract customers  and  not  be  undercut  by 
competitors  banks  would  have  to offer depositors  contracts that prom- 
ised as high  a level  of expected  utility as possible. 
To assess  the  effects  of  liberalization,  one  may  analyze  how  a less 
competitive  banking system would  behave  in this context. We study that 
question  in Chang and Velasco (1998b), using  a related model  that draws 
directly on Diamond  and Dybvig  (1983). There we  find that a monopoly 
bank is less prone to runs than competitive  banks; the greater fragility of 
competitive  banking  arises  from  the  larger  rate  of  return  it  offers  to 
short-term  depositors.  Relative to competitive  banks,  the monopoly  will 
reduce  payments  to depositors.  This hurts  depositors,  but in general  it 
also  implies  that  the  potential  short-term  obligations  of  the  bank  are 
smaller.  This  means  that  the  monopoly  bank  will  be  less illiquid.  The 36 *  CHANG & VELASCO 
implication  is  that  enhanced  competition  in  the  financial  sector  may 
improve  depositors'  welfare if no runs take place, but at the same time it 
may make crises more likely. 
5.2 DEPOSIT  INSURANCE 
It is  a plausible  conjecture  that  self-fulfilling  crises  would  disappear  if 
governments  of emerging  economies  established  adequate deposit  insur- 
ance institutions.  Presumably,  if domestic  deposits  were  guaranteed  by 
the government,  depositors  would  have no incentive  to run on commer- 
cial banks.  In  addition,  this  would  seem  to  entail  no  cost,  since  the 
insurance  funds  would  not be needed  in equilibrium.  In this subsection 
we  examine  this conjecture.  Deposit  insurance  funds  may indeed  elimi- 
nate  crises,  provided  that they  are of sufficient  size.  But deposit  insur- 
ance is not  costless  and may result,  at best,  in the implementation  of a 
suboptimal  allocation. 
Here and in the rest of the paper  we  assume,  for simplicity,  that p = 
0. Consider  the simple  setup  of Section  3.1, except that the government 
requires  the bank to pay  a lump  sum  z in period  0 in order to finance 
an insurance  fund  of the same size.  The government  agrees to keep z in 
liquid  form,  and  to  take  over  the  servicing  of  deposit  withdrawals  in 
period  1  in  case  the  commercial  bank  runs  out  of  resources  in  that 
period; otherwise,  z is returned to the bank in period  2.36 
The bank's planning  problem  is the same as in Section 3.1, except that 
the resources  it can invest  in period  0 are given  by w -  z instead  of w, 
and that it will anticipate a lump-sum  transfer z in period 2. Hence,  if z is 
not too large, the solution  is very similar to that in Section 3.1: the bank 
will  hold  just  enough  liquidity,  Ai, to keep  alive  the unlucky  long-term 
assets,  and  invest  the  rest,  now  k'  =  w  -  z  -  Ai, in  illiquid  assets. 
Expected and total consumption  in period  2 will now  be 
c+ = Rk'-f+  z =  -  (R -  )z.  (19) 
The last expression  implies  that building  the insurance fund is costly and 
necessarily  results  in a suboptimal  allocation.  The intuition  is that the 
insurance  fund  must  be kept in liquid form, whose  opportunity  cost is 
R -  1 per unit. 
Assume  now  that  the  bank  implements  its  desired  allocation  via  a 
demand  deposit  system.  If 
b + rk' + z =  Ai + r(w -  z -  Ai) + z >  i,  (20) 
36. Readers familiar with  Chang  and Velasco (1998a) will  recognize  that this definition  of 
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it should  be intuitively  obvious  there  cannot  be  an equilibrium  run on 
the bank. Indeed,  in a run a lucky depositor would  receive i by withdraw- 
ing i in period  1 and absconding,  while  she would  receive c' in period  2 
by not withdrawing  i in period  1. But then it cannot be optimal for her to 
participate  in  the  run.  Hence  an  insurance  fund  large  enough  would 
eliminate  the possibility  of runs, but cannot be optimal. 
It is also of interest to analyze what would  happen  if (20) failed, that is, 
if the insurance  fund were  insufficient.  In that case,  a run would  clearly 
be possible,  in the sense  that it would  be an equilibrium  for all deposi- 
tors to attempt to withdraw  i from the bank. The interesting  observation 
about  such  a crisis  is that it would  be  expressed  as a failure of deposit 
insurance, since it would  be the insurance fund that would  not be capable 
of honoring  its commitments. 
A  related  point  is  that,  in  order  for  deposit  insurance  to  eliminate 
crises, the insurance  fund must be sufficient  to cover the risk of a general- 
ized banking panic,  not only bank-specific  risk. To see this, suppose  that 
depositors  are equally allocated not to one but two banks called A and B, 
and  that  there  are  two  symmetric  states  of  nature.  In  one  state,  the 
fraction of illiquid assets  hit by a bad shock is  i  >  A in bank A and A in 
bank  B, and  vice  versa  in the  other  state.  Hence  there  is no  aggregate 
uncertainty, although  there is bank-specific  risk. Suppose  now  that there 
is an insurance fund of size z = (t  -  A)i to be used  to help a bank if it has 
to service  more than A depositors  in period  1. Then,  clearly, there is an 
honest  equilibrium  in which  all depositors  withdraw  according  to their 
true type and the insurance fund is used to help fund unlucky  long-term 
investments.  But if (20) fails,  a bank run is clearly an equilibrium.  This 
may be the reason why  deposit  insurance  institutions  that perform well 
in "normal" times seem underfunded  in times of crisis. 
The main conclusion:  for a country to "self-insure" its banking  system 
is possible,  but costly. Can it be done  better by purchasing  such  insur- 
ance abroad? After all, if lenders  can diversify  away  the risk of country- 
specific  bank runs,  such  insurance  need  not be  expensive.  This is pre- 
sumably  the logic  of the Argentine  policy  of contracting  a line of credit 
(for  which  a  premium  is  paid  annually)  to  be  used  in  case  of  bank 
troubles. 
The idea  is appealing,  but not  without  potential  difficulties.  First, if 
there is regional  or global  contagion,  the risk of bank runs may not be 
easily  diversifiable  for lenders.  Second,  the obvious  potential  for moral 
hazard  makes  such  contracts  hard  to  write  and  enforce.  Third is  the 
issue  of size: press  accounts  put  the Argentine  line  of credit at U.S.  $6 
billion,  which  is a small fraction of M2. Whether larger amounts  may be 
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5.3 POLICY  IMPLICATIONS 
Furman and Stiglitz (1998) write that "the evidence  that financial liberal- 
ization  increases  the  vulnerability  of countries  to  crises  is overwhelm- 
ing." The examples  we have just examined  suggest  precisely  the same.  It 
would  seem,  then,  that the case for strengthening  supervision  and carry- 
ing out liberalization very carefully is also very strong.  And indeed,  one 
finds  such  advice  being  freely  dispensed  in  the  post  mortems  on  the 
recent crises. 
But one  should  not  trust financial  regulation  alone  as the panacea  of 
crisis prevention.  As  we  have  seen,  mandating  institutions  to  remain 
liquid is not cheap.  There is also the issue of design  and enforceability  of 
financial  regulation.  Regulators  have  been  overwhelmed,  and  financial 
crises  have  occurred,  in countries  as advanced  as Japan, Sweden,  and 
the United  States.  Why should  emerging  markets do any better? 
And macroeconomic  conditions,  if sufficiently  severe,  can overwhelm 
even  the  best-managed  financial  system.  Developed  country  banks 
might  not  have  survived  the  massive  depreciations  and external  credit 
squeezes  that  financial  institutions  in  Thailand,  Korea,  or Brazil have 
had  to face.  This suggests  that most  financial  crises  are also macroeco- 
nomic.  To that issue  we now  turn. 
6.  The  Real  Exchange  Rate 
So  far in  the  analysis,  all real consequences  of  financial  distress  have 
come from the early and costly liquidation  of investment.  Interpreted  in 
a literal sense,  such  liquidation  an also account for only  a small part of 
the  output  losses  that  we  observe  in  Mexico  or Thailand.  A  broader 
interpretation,  which  included  projects  left  unfinished  or  not  under- 
taken for lack of finance,  would  take us farther. But, as Krugman (1999) 
has  argued,  ". . . the  main  channels  though  which  financial  panic  has 
turned good  assets  into bad involve  not so much physical  liquidation  or 
unfinished  projects as macroeconomic  crisis: companies  that looked  sol- 
vent  before  the  crisis  have  gone  under  because  collapsing  investment 
has  produced  a  severe  recession,  or because  capital  flight  has  led  to 
currency depreciation  that makes their dollar debts balloon.  ...  " 
Accordingly,  we  are led  to  explore  how  our  framework  can  be  ex- 
tended  to  allow  for such  endogenous  liquidation  effects,  and  thereby 
provide  a more  realistic  account  of  crises.  The  key,  as  conjectured  by 
Krugman  (1999) and earlier by Calvo  (1998), is the behavior  of the real 
exchange  rate. Indeed,  real depreciation  may be crucial in making bank 
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Take the same  model  as before,  recalling that we  are imposing  p =  0, 
but adding  a nontraded  good.  This good  is produced  by many competi- 
tive firms with  a simple  technology:  a dollar invested  in period  0 yields 
A  >  1 of  the  nontradable  in period  1. This output  is then  stored  and 
consumed  in period 2, along with  tradables consumption. 
Firms in the nontradable  sector must borrow the dollars needed  to in- 
vest  in period  0 from the  commercial  bank.  Clearly, for the bank to be 
indifferent between  lending  to the nontradable-good  firms and investing 
in tradable goods,  the rate of interest paid by the nontradable producers 
must be the same as the marginal return earned by tradable production: R. 
It follows  that the profits, denominated  in dollars, earned by the repre- 
sentative  nontradables  producer  are Ah/e  -  Rh, where  h is the amount 
invested  by the typical nontradables  firm, and e is the price of tradables 
in terms of nontradables-that  is,  the real exchange rate. The zero-profit 
condition  ensures  that this relative price is given  in equilibrium by 
A 
-  (21) 
R 
where  overbars denote  equilibrium values. 
The composition  of output is determined  on the demand  side. Assume 
that consumers  have Cobb-Douglas  preferences and allocate a fixed por- 
tion  0 of total consumption  expenditure  in period 2 to nontraded  goods, 
and a portion  1 -  0 to traded goods.  Since the resources  allocated by the 
bank to domestic investment  are w -  b, the amount going to production of 
tradables is w -  b -  h. It follows  that output and consumption  of tradables 
is R(w -  b -  h), while  output  and consumption  of nontradables  is Ah. 
Consumer  optimality  conditions  then  dictate that 
A 
OR(w  -  b -  h) =  (1 -  0)-  h.  (22)  e 
But,  in  equilibrium,  the  real exchange  rate is expected  to be  e =  A/R. 
Inserting  this value  into (22) and solving  the resulting  equation  implies 
that  total  investment  in  the  nontradables  sector  is  h  =  O(w -  b) and, 
correspondingly,  in the tradables sector is k = w -  b -  h = (1 -  O)(w  -  b). 
It only  remains  to  check  whether  it is  optimal  for the  bank  to hold 
enough  liquidity  to shore  up distressed  investments  in tradables.  If so, 
the dollar value  of total expected  consumption  is R(w -  Ai) -  f; if not,  it 
is [(1 -  A)R +  Ar] (1 -  O)w +  ROw -  f.  The first option  dominates  pro- 
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w(l  -  0)(R  -  r) >  Ri,  (23) 
which  we  assume.37 As a consequence,  b =  Ai. 
We conclude  that investment  in tradables  is k =  (1 -  0)(w -  Ai), and 
investment  in nontradables  is h =  O(w -  Ai). The dollar value  of total 
output  accruing to the bank in period  2 from the two  sectors,  given  the 
real exchange  rate in (21), is therefore simply  R(w -  Ai). 
Consider  now  how  this allocation  can be decentralized  by means  of a 
demand  deposit  system,  in  which  agents'  depositors  surrender  their 
endowments  for the right to R(w -  Ai) dollars in period 2 plus i dollars in 
period  1 if unlucky.  Using  arguments  identical  to those  in  earlier sec- 
tions,  one  can show  that,  if the incentive  compatibility  constraint  (5) is 
satisfied,  there is an honest  equilibrium  to the game  among  depositors, 
in which  everyone  reports truthfully. 
It is also possible  to have self-fulfilling  bank runs, as in earlier sections. 
However,  there  is a mechanism  here  that was  not  present  before.  The 
key  observation  is  that  the  dollar  resources  at the  bank's  disposal  in 
period  1 are its  liquid-asset  holdings  Ai, plus  the  liquidation  value  of 
tradables investment  rk, plus the dollar market value of the repayment  of 
the loan made  to nontradables  production.  But this last quantity  varies 
with  the real exchange  rate. Indeed,  we  saw above that a relative price e 
guarantees  zero profits for the borrower, which then transfers the whole 
value  of his  revenue-equal  to Ah//  =  RO(w -  Ai)-to  the  bank.  At  a 
more depreciated  real exchange  rate (a higher e), on the other hand,  the 
nontradables  firm is broke, and cannot repay the whole  amount owed  to 
the bank. Indeed,  for e >  e the bank will get only (Ak)h dollars, which  is 
less than it is contractually  entitled  to. 
Now,  if there is a bank run the total supply  of tradeables  in the econ- 
omy is only Ai + r(l  -  0) (w -  Ai)  which,  by (23), is smaller than the R(1 - 
0)(w -  Ai) units that would  have been  supplied  with no run. Hence,  the 
real exchange  rate is now  given  by a condition  similar to (22) but evalu- 
ated at the new  output  and consumption  levels38 
er  A  (1  0) R(w -i)  >  (24) 
R /  i + r (1 -  0)  (w -  Ai)  R 
37. In the  model  with  only  one  good  the equivalent  condition  was  w(R -  r) >  Ri, which 
was  guaranteed  by  our  assumptions.  Here  an  amended  version  of  that  condition 
would  read (1 -  O)A(R  -  r)w :  [R -  (1 -  A)]i. That would  guarantee  that in this two- 
good  model  agents  in autarky held  positive  liquidity,  and  so  did the bank  [condition 
(23) would  always  hold]. 
38. Notice that no consumption  takes place until period 2. But all output to be consumed  in 
period  2 reaches the public  already in period  1. Hence,  one can assume  that all trades 
take  place  in  period  1,  satisfying  the  consumption  optimality  conditions  that  must 
prevail in period 2. During trade the real exchange  rate e is determined. Liquidity  Crises  in Emerging  Markets  *  41 
It follows  that in a run the bank can at most have access to Ah/er + rk + 
Ai dollars to meet withdrawals  in period  1. The illiquidity condition  that 
is necessary  and sufficient  for a run to be an equilibrium is therefore 
A  - 
i >-h+rk  +  b,  (25) 
er 
which,  using  (24) and  the  definitions  of h,  k, and  b, can be  written  as 
(1  -  A -  0)i 
r  .  (26) 
(w  -  i) (1  -  0) 
As  in  the  case  of  the  model  with  one  good,  a  sufficiently  small  r is 
necessary  to make self-fulfilling  runs possible. 
The crucial part of the  argument  is that the  liquidation  value  of the 
bank is now  endogenous. It depends  on the real exchange  rate, through 
the  value  of the  loans  to the  nontradables  sector; in  turn,  the  real ex- 
change rate is determined  by whether  a crisis happens.  This can be seen 
most  clearly if Ahkr +  rk +  b <  i <  Rh +  rk +  b. In this case,  a crisis can 
happen  if and only if a real depreciation  is expected  in period  1. 
One might have thought  that the presence  of nontraded  goods  would 
give the government  greater latitude in dealing with crises. After all, it is 
traded goods  that are "scarce" in period  1 when  the economy  is interna- 
tionally  illiquid.  But as long  as the withdrawal  of size  i that agents  can 
make  is  denominated  in  tradables,  that  conjecture  is  incorrect.39 For 
instance,  giving  the government  the right to borrow  from the nontrad- 
ables  sector  in  period  1 does  not  help.  The  proceeds  of  the  loan  still 
would  have to be converted  into tradable goods,  because  it is such goods 
that are needed  to  stop  an incipient  bank  run.  And  since  only  b such 
goods  are available, liquidation  would  still have  to take place. 
The main point  of this section  is that introducing  a second  good  gives 
macroeconomic  phenomena  a role both in producing  financial crises and 
magnifying  their effects.  In this setup,  the coefficient  0 is the share of the 
traded sector in the economy.  Since this is also the sector in which capital 
is illiquid,  0 is also the  proxy  for the  extent  to which  liquidation  is the 
source of the real costs  of a financial crisis. The coefficient  0 does  not to 
be  particularly  large for (26) to be  satisfied  and  crises  to be  possible.40 
This implies  that a good  chunk of the fall in bank income  in a crisis may 
39. We  analyze  below  the  case  in  which  this  liability  is  denominated  in  terms  of 
nontradables. 
40. For instance,  (26) shows  that if r =  0, it is sufficient  that 0 >  1 -  A. 42 *  CHANG & VELASCO 
come from the real depreciation  and the resulting bankruptcy of nontrad- 
ables producers,  and not from the physical  liquidation  of assets. 
From a modeling  point of view, real effects here result from the interac- 
tion  of  a financial-sector  inefficiency  with  the  behavior  of  the  real ex- 
change  rate. In that sense,  this model  is similar to those  by Calvo (1988) 
and  Krugman  (1999). The  only  difference  is  in  the  assumed  financial 
problem: Calvo  assumes  bankruptcy  costs  and Krugman collateral con- 
straints, while  we  assume  costly liquidation  in the tradables sector. 
6.1 POLICY  IMPLICATIONS:  CRISIS  PREVENTION 
Forcing domestic  banks  that borrow  in dollars  to lend  in the same  cur- 
rency is a popular way  to minimize  risk. Our analysis  suggests  that that 
policy is largely useless.  In the preceding  subsection,  all bank borrowing 
and lending  was  in terms of tradable goods  (loosely,  in terms of foreign 
currency), but that did not insulate  the bank. The reason is that the real 
devaluation  risk is simply  passed  on to firms in the nontradables  sector, 
who  default  partially  on  their  loans  when  the  relative  price  of  their 
output  falls unexpectedly. 
What  would  work  in  this  context  is  to have  both  loans  to  the  non- 
tradables sector and at least some  bank liabilities denominated  in terms 
of  the  nontradable  good.  To see  this  more  formally,  imagine  that  the 
contract now  requires the bank to pay unlucky  depositors  the tradables 
equivalent  of ei units  of nontradables.  That is to say, the portion  of the 
contract covering  period-1  payments  now  denominates  these  withdraw- 
als  in  nontradables  but  continues  to  make  them  payable  in  tradables. 
Clearly, this  does  not  affect the properties  of the honest  equilibrium:  a 
measure  A of depositors  still withdraw  ei/e =  i units  of tradables, which 
allows  them  to  restore  damaged  investments.  But,  as  one  can  readily 
show,  the  illiquidity  condition  for  a  run  equilibrium  to  be  possible 
changes  to 
e  A 
i->  h+rk +  b.  (27) 
er  er 
Since e/er <  1, the preceding  condition  is more stringent than the one for 
the case in which  allowable  withdrawals  are denominated  in tradables, 
(25).  Hence,  changing  the  denomination  of  bank  liabilities  makes  the 
bank less vulnerable  to a run. 
The  intuition  is  simple:  in  the  event  of  a run  the  relative  price  of 
nontradables  falls,  which  reduces  the number  of units  of tradables  the 
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could be extended  to foreign debt contracts, which  we have neglected  to 
consider  here.  If foreign  loans  were  denominated  in terms of nontrad- 
ables, their service cost would  also fall in the event of a run-induced  real 
depreciation,  further alleviating  the liquidity position  of the bank. 
How to achieve this in practice? One possibility  is to restrict the domes- 
tic bank to borrow  only  from local lenders.  This is plausible  if national 
savings  are high  and  the  domestic  capital  market deep  (Chile  is often 
lauded  on  these  grounds,  partly because  of its privatized  pension  sys- 
tem).  But capital-poor  emerging  economies  will  still typically  want  to 
run current account deficits and import capital from abroad; if banks are 
not allowed  to do this, someone  else (like Indonesian  corporates) proba- 
bly will. An alternative is to encourage  foreign lenders  to lend in domes- 
tic currency, and hence  share with local borrowers some of the exchange 
risk.  Loans  in  nominal  pesos  are  unlikely,  but  loans  indexed  to  the 
domestic  price level have more of a ring of plausibility. Again,  Chile has 
made some progress  along these  lines, encouraging  a nascent market for 
indexed  foreign loans. 
6.2 POLICY  IMPLICATIONS:  CRISIS  MANAGEMENT 
In this  model  the  real  exchange  rate  depreciates  because  output  and 
consumption  of  tradables  falls  relative  to  that  of nontradables,  so  the 
relative price of the former must  rise. The best way  to deal with  this,  of 
course,  would  be to get real resources  to the hands  of the bank before it 
liquidates  its investment,  thereby  preventing  the  fall in tradables'  out- 
put.  An  equivalence  policy  would  be  to  extend  emergency  nonbank 
credit to firms in the tradables sector, so that they could repay their loans 
to local banks without  having  to cut down  trees or padlock factories. 
In practice neither policy is likely to be very useful.  Getting the money 
to the right place quickly enough  is difficult.  Informational asymmetries 
(why  would  foreign  banks  lend  to  firms  that  are being  refused  local 
credit?)  and  the  potential  for  moral  hazard  make  matters  even  more 
complicated. 
Straight balance-of-payments  support might be easier and just as effec- 
tive.  The problem here is that local output  of tradables falls and so does 
their  consumption.  But  tradables  can  also  be  imported,  propping  up 
consumption  levels  and hence  avoiding  real depreciation.  Foreign lend- 
ers and  multilaterals  may  frown  at the  thought  of emergency  loans  to 
finance  consumption,  but in that context  that is exactly what is needed. 
And  a penny  of support  may  do  a pound  of good:  high  levels  of trad- 
ables consumption  prevent  bankruptcies  in the nontradables  sector and 
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7. Government  Debts  and  Deficits 
In  the  so-called  first-generation  models  of  crises  (Krugman,  1979), 
balance-of-payments  crises were ultimately caused by ongoing  fiscal defi- 
cits.  However,  fiscal  accounts  were  essentially  in  balance  before  the 
Mexican  1994 and  the  Asian  1997-1998  crashes,  and hence  first-gener- 
ation  models  have  fallen  a bit out  of fashion.  This does  not  mean  that 
fiscal  debts  and  deficits  are irrelevant  to recent crises,  but  instead  that 
the relevant channel is not what the earlier literature stressed.  The chan- 
nel from deficits  to crises runs not through  the monetization  of govern- 
ment  financing  gaps;  the problem  has  more  to do with  the effects  that 
government  debt-especially  if short-term-has  on the overall liquidity 
position  of the country's  financial  system.  Calvo  (1995) was  the first to 
recognize  this. 
The role  of the  infamous  tesobonos  in the  Mexican  1994 crisis-upon 
which  Calvo's  observations  were  based-is  now  well  known;  a more 
recent example  is Brazil. Bevilacqua et al. (1998) report that by year-end 
1996, the  Brazilian government  had  approximately  U.S.  $150 billion  in 
outstanding  domestic  securities,  with  an average  maturity  of 180 days. 
While data on the precise maturity structure are not available, this num- 
ber alone is cause for concern: on average, U.S. $75 billion had to be rolled 
over by the  Brazilian government  every  semester.  By contrast,  interna- 
tional reserves were only slightly above U.S. $58 billion at the end of 1996. 
This potentially  explosive  situation  suggests  why  Brazil was  the  Latin 
economy  hardest hit by the reverberations  of the Asian meltdown  in the 
second half of 1997. In November  of that year a speculative  attack against 
the real forced the authorities  to increase interest rates to 42% (at a time 
when  domestic  inflation was running  at less than 5% per annum)  and to 
announce  cuts  amounting  to 2% of GDP from the government  budget. 
The cuts were never implemented,  and the astronomical real interest rates 
created a sharp monetarist  arithmetic problem.  A second  and more dra- 
matic package was launched in late 1998, this time with IMF  blessing,  but 
the currency collapsed  anyway  in January 1999. At the time of writing, 
real interest  rates remain high,  and debt dynamics  are still explosive  or 
close  to it. Domestic  debt has  risen  to over  54% of GDP  With massive 
rollovers necessary  every  month,  Brazil remains vulnerable. 
Suppose  that  the  government  has  to  raise  some  funds  in  period  0. 
Specifically, suppose  that it needs  to finance some  expenditure  that costs 
g dollars,  and  it has  decided  to hold  x dollars  in liquid  form-say,  for 
deposit  insurance  purposes-that  will be transferred to the commercial 
bank if there is no need  to fight a run. 
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residents  in period  0.  From the  viewpoint  of the  commercial  bank,  its 
planning  problem  is the same as in Section 3.1, except that the resources 
that it can invest in period 0 are given not by w but by w -  T, and that the 
bank will receive  a transfer x in period  2. It is not hard to show  that the 
expected  utility for consumers  of this option  is 
ca =  R(w  -  T -  Ai)  -f  +  x  =  e -  (R -  l)x  -  Rg. 
Relative  to the  social  optimum  c, this  option  implies  a cost  of holding 
liquidity, (R -  l)x; in addition  there is the cost of paying  for government 
expenditure,  Rg. 
Suppose  now  that there is an alternative: the government  can borrow 
T in international  markets.  In order to repay its debt,  suppose  that the 
government  can levy  a tax, whose  rate is r, on the return to long-term 
investment  in period 2. The commercial bank's problem is the same as in 
Section  3.1,  except  that the perceived  return to long-term  investment  is 
R(1 -  r) instead  of R, and  that it will  receive  a transfer x in period  2. 
Hence  expected  consumption  will be 
Cb =  R(1  -  )(w-  i) -f  + x.  (28) 
Now,  for the  government  to be  able  to repay  its  debt,  it must  be  that 
rRk =  TR(w -  Ai) =  T.  (29) 
Combining  the two previous  expressions,  we  obtain 
cb = R(w -  Ai) -  T -f+  x = C -  g,  (30) 
implying  that cb  >  ca. Hence it is efficient for the government  to borrow in 
order to finance its needs  in period 0. 
We have,  therefore,  a situation  in which  it is good  for the government 
to be in deficit. However,  a crucial point is that, while  fiscal deficits may 
not be bad per se,  they may create problems  because  of their financing. 
To see  this,  suppose  that the government  borrows  a fraction  r of the  T 
dollars  needed  in period  0 as a short-term  loan.  The reader can check 
that,  if  all  foreign  creditors  roll  over  their  loans  in  period  1  and  all 
depositors  withdraw  honestly,  there  is  no  panic  and  consumption  is 
given by (30). However,  suppose  that foreign creditors refuse to roll over 
their loans  to the government,  and that domestic  depositors  also panic. 
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i +  oT >  x + bb +  rk,  (31) 
expectations  of a crisis must  be self-fulfilling:  all assets  of the economy 
will  be  liquidated,  and  the  commercial  banking  system  will  become 
bankrupt.41 
Why would  foreign creditors stop lending  to the government?  Because 
the crisis implies  that all of k will be liquidated in the period 1, and hence 
there will be no fiscal revenue  in period 2. In other words,  the expectation 
of a fiscal crisis would  trigger the refusal of foreign lending,  which  itself 
creates the fiscal crisis. 
This all assumes  that the crisis happens  with zero probability. If it hap- 
pened  with positive  probability, then risk-neutral foreign lenders  would 
ask  to be  compensated  for the  loss  in  the  event  of  a run.  Contractual 
interest  rates on  loans  to the  government  would  exceed  world  rates- 
again, we would  have a term structure of interest rates, and high rates all 
around.  None  of which,  of course,  bodes  well  for stability. High  rates 
increase  the  servicing  cost  of debt,  and  can easily  lead  to a monetarist 
arithmetic problem  (in fact, this is plausible  interpretation  of Brazil's re- 
cent  travails).  But if the  government  tries  to  lower  servicing  costs  by 
resorting  to short-term  debt  (increasing  (o), vulnerability  is increased.42 
One  other aspect  deserves  attention.  Condition  (31) may be satisfied 
even  if the insurance  fund x seems  sufficient  to cover systemic  risk, that 
is,  (31) and i <  x +  b + rk may hold  simultaneously.  In this case,  a crisis 
cannot be possible  unless  foreign creditors refuse to roll over their short- 
term loans. 
7.1 POLICY  IMPLICATIONS:  CRISIS  PREVENTION 
The  strongest  implication  of  the  preceding  analysis  is  that  the  fisc's 
short-term  debt  position  should  be  taken  into  account  when  trying  to 
measure the degree of potential  illiquidity of a country. Measures like M2 
over reserves  or short-term private debt over reserves  typically fail to do 
this. By late 1994 Mexico had U.S. $29 billion in liquid tesobonos,  and only 
U.S.  $6 billion  in  cash  reserves  (plus  another  $6 billion  in  credit lines 
from  NAFTA  partners).  Hence,  net  of  government  short-term  dollar 
commitments,  Mexico had negative  reserves.43 
41. We  are making  an  implicit  assumption  that  in  period  1 the  government's  and  the 
commercial  bank's  balance  sheet  can be  effectively  consolidated.  Such  would  be the 
case if, for instance,  the government  were  able to tax the bank in period  1 in order to 
finance the difference  between  T and x. 
42. Of course,  the problem  would  disappear  if  r were  zero,  that is, if all government  debt 
were  long-term.  But the government,  just like the bank whose  problem  was discussed 
in Section 3 above,  may find it optimal to borrow short-term. 
43. Notice  that, if the exchange  rate is fixed, such netting  out should  include  all short-term 
public  debt,  not  just  dollar  debt.  This  point,  which  was  mentioned  in  Section  2,  is 
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7.2 POLICY  IMPLICATIONS:  CRISIS  MANAGEMENT 
A very  controversial  point  in recent discussions  is the degree  to which 
IMF disbursements  should  have  been  conditional  on  sharp  fiscal  re- 
trenchment  by  the  troubled  countries.  Many  critics  have  accused  the 
fund of worsening  the crisis by insisting  on fiscal austerity as a precondi- 
tion for lending.  Our model  lends  some  support  to this criticism.  Sup- 
pose  that T is a loan not from private creditors but from an international 
institution,  such  as the IME Suppose  also that, in keeping  with  current 
practice,  disbursement  of  T in  period  1 is  conditional  on  prospective 
fiscal discipline.  In an honest  equilibrium,  fiscal revenue  in period  2 is 
large,  and justifies  the release  of the  T dollars in period  1. But in a run 
equilibrium,  tax revenue  in period  2 is destroyed  and T is not released. 
Ex post,  it will look as if the international  agency's  decision  to withhold 
T had been justified.  But clearly the crisis would  have not occurred if the 
agency  had  committed  T unconditionally.  Of  course,  there  are many 
other  reasons  for conditionality.  And  fiscal adjustment  may  indeed  be 
needed,  especially  if debt has built up and the costs of bank bailouts  are 
mounting.  But in advocating  such conditionality  one should  be mindful 
of the potentially  self-defeating  mechanism  highlighted  here. 
Also,  the  discussion  in  Section  3 of  how  to  deal  with  coordination 
failure by lenders  remains  applicable.  In the event  of a crisis lenders  are 
panicking,  and  everyone  would  be  better  off  if their  actions  could  be 
coordinated.  Negotiated  debt rollovers and similar strategies  are clearly 
of use here as well. 
8.  The  Exchange-Rate  Regime 
Our  analysis  so  far has  abstracted  from  monetary  considerations.  Yet 
they  are clearly  crucial for policy  purposes.  Only  after extending  the 
model  to introduce  domestic  currency can one discuss  the proper role of 
central banks in providing  credit, regulating  the money  supply,  or man- 
aging  exchange  rates. 
In this section  we  modify  the basic model  of Section 3 to allow for the 
existence  of domestic  and foreign money.44 As suggested  in that section, 
assume  that there is an international  currency  ("dollars"), and that the 
dollar price of a unit of consumption  in the world market is fixed at one. 
With this trivial extension,  the analysis  of previous  sections  can be inter- 
preted  as applicable  to an economy  that is completely  "dollarized."45 
44. This section  is based  on Chang and Velasco (1998a). 
45. While  this observation  is trivial from a theoretical  perspective,  it has nontrivial  conse- 
quences  in practice,  in particular for the ongoing  debate on replacing  Latin American 
currencies with  the U.S.  dollar. 48 *  CHANG & VELASCO 
In order to allow for other possibilities,  assume  that there is a domestic 
currency, referred to as "pesos."  Pesos  are costlessly  issued  by a domes- 
tic central bank. A demand  for pesos  can be introduced  in several ways, 
but for the sake of simplicity  assume  here that there is a legal restriction 
that forces domestic  banks to pay its depositors  in pesos. 
Since  the bank's  sources  of funds  are in dollars,  there must  be some 
arrangement  by which  the central bank provides  pesos  to the commer- 
cial bank.  Since  depositors  receive  peso  payments  from the commercial 
bank but  need  dollars  to buy  consumption  in the  world  market,  there 
must  be some  system  by which  the central bank sells  dollars to deposi- 
tors. These  arrangements  are what  we  call a regime. Difference  assump- 
tions  about  the  central bank's  credit  policy,  or about  its  exchange-rate 
policy, give  rise to the study  of different regimes. 
8.1 A CURRENCY  BOARD 
The simplest  regime is a currency board. In a currency board, the central 
bank  stands  ready  to  sell  or buy  pesos  for dollars  at a fixed  exchange 
rate, which we shall fix at one.  (It is useful  to think of the central bank as 
a vending  machine,  which  gives  one peso  for each dollar deposited  in it, 
and vice versa.) 
Given  a currency board  (or in fact any of the other regimes  we  shall 
study),  the bank's  planning  problem  is the same  as in Section  3.1.  The 
interesting  question  is: how  successful  is  a demand  deposit  system  in 
implementing  the  social  optimum  in the  different  regimes?  In order to 
answer  it, we  need  to alter the assumptions  of Section 3.2 to accommo- 
date the use  of different  currencies.  It is simplest  to modify  the sequen- 
tial  service  constraint  in  the  following  way  As  in  Section  3.2,  at  the 
beginning  of period  1 depositors  visit  the  commercial  bank in random 
order.  Each depositor  may,  upon  her  arrival at the  bank,  withdraw  i 
pesos  on demand,  assuming  the bank has not gone bankrupt. The main 
assumption  is that, after visiting  the bank, depositors  join a second  line, 
this time at the central bank, to exchange  whatever  pesos  they may hold 
for  dollars  at the  fixed  exchange  rate.  The  commercial  bank,  in  turn, 
services  withdrawals  by  liquidating  its  assets  and  selling  the  resulting 
revenue  (which  is in dollars) for pesos  at the Central Bank. 
Given the timing  of events,  the central bank cannot run out of dollars 
to honor its exchange-rate  commitment;  in other words,  with a currency 
board  there  cannot  be  a balance-of-payments  crisis.  However,  there may 
still be a banking  crisis: as before,  the commercial  bank goes bankrupt in 
period  1 if, after liquidating  all of its assets,  there  are still depositors  in 
line attempting  to withdraw  i. 
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of its investments  and repays foreign creditors and depositors;  the latter 
are paid in pesos  that the bank obtains from selling  dollars to the central 
bank.  Depositors  then  visit the central bank to exchange  their pesos  for 
dollars which  can be used  to buy consumption. 
This  completes  the  description  of  a  currency-board  regime.  Aside 
from the  fact that the commercial  bank pays  deposits  in pesos  that de- 
positors  exchange  back for dollars,  the model  is essentially  the same  as 
in Section  3.2.  As  a consequence,  a currency-board  regime  implies  the 
same outcomes  as in that subsection.  There is one honest  equilibrium in 
which  the social optimum  is obtained.  But also,  there a run equilibrium 
in which  all agents attempt to withdraw  i pesos  and the commercial bank 
goes bankrupt in period 1 if and only if the illiquidity condition  (6) holds. 
In short,  the analysis  of a completely  dollarized  economy  in previous 
sections  applies  to  a  currency  board.  More  important,  the  currency 
board is no panacea: while  balance-of-payments  crises are not possible, 
bank  crises  may  still  occur. This is,  in modern  language,  a conclusion 
that economists  have  known  at least since Bagehot: systems  that tie the 
central bank's hands  and prevent  it from printing money  also prevent  it 
from coming  to the rescue of banks in times of trouble. Under a currency 
board or the gold standard, the domestic  banking system  has no domes- 
tic lender of last resort. The price of low inflation may be endemic  finan- 
cial instability. 
Not  everyone  feels  this  is a problem.  Dornbusch  (1998) has  recently 
written: "The counter argument that currency boards or full dollarization 
sacrifice  the  lender  of  last  resort  function  are  deeply  misguided  .... 
Lender of last resort can readily be rented,  along with bank supervision, 
by  requiring  financial  institutions  to  carry off-shore  guarantees."  But 
how  exactly does one rent such a lender? We argued in the discussion  on 
deposit  insurance  that credit lines Argentine  style  are a step in the right 
direction,  but they  are unlikely  to be large enough  to cover the bulk of 
the liquid liabilities of a country's  financial system.  A currently fashion- 
able  alternative  is  to  encourage  foreign  ownership  of domestic  banks, 
hoping  that equity  holders  abroad will  serve  as lenders  of  last  resort. 
Again,  this  is probably  a good  idea,  but  is a completely  untested  one. 
Will Citibank U.S. ride to the rescue every time that Latin or Asian bank 
in which  it has a 10% equity  stake gets into trouble? Perhaps.  But hang- 
ing  a whole  financial  system's  health  on  that  conjecture  seems  risky 
indeed. 
8.2 FIXED  RATES  WITH  A LENDER  OF LAST  RESORT 
The rules of a currency board prevent the central bank from assisting  the 
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be  avoided  if the  central bank  lends  enough  pesos  to  the  commercial 
bank  to prevent  its failure.  There is much  evidence  that monetary  au- 
thorities have done precisely  this in times of recent trouble. The problem 
is that, by doing  so,  they have also precipitated  the end of many a fixed 
exchange  rate.  Diaz-Alejandro  (1985) and  Velasco  (1987) argue  that  it 
was  precisely  a money-financed  bank bailout that caused  the end of the 
Chilean  tablita (and then the fix) of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Sachs, 
Tornell, and Velasco (1996a) claim that it was  the fragility of the banking 
system  that prevented  Mexican authorities  from raising interest rates in 
1994 to  defend  the  peg.  In Asia  the  problem  recurs.  Corsetti,  Pesenti, 
and  Roubini  (1998b) write:  "Well before  the  onset  of the  crisis,  several 
governments  were engaged  in an extensive  policy of bailing out financial 
institutions.  Such  a  policy  was  by  itself  a  source  of  monetary  cre- 
ation.  ...  As it turned  out,  it eventually  induced  a continuous  spiral of 
currency depreciations.  ..  . 
To examine  this issue,  assume  that the central bank grants a credit line 
to the commercial bank to be used  in case of an attack-that  is,  if more 
than  A depositors  attempt  to withdraw  i. In such  case,  the central bank 
agrees  to lend,  at a zero interest  rate, as many  pesos  as needed  for the 
commercial  bank to service  further withdrawals.  In exchange,  the  cen- 
tral bank  obtains  temporary  control  over  the  remaining  assets  of  the 
commercial  bank,  including  the right to liquidate  them  as necessary  to 
honor its exchange-rate  commitment.  The latter assumption  implies  that 
the central bank is committed  to defending  the fixed exchange  rate for as 
long  as it is feasible. 
Consider  what  may happen  in period  1. Depositors  arrive at the com- 
mercial bank in random  order and  may  withdraw  i. The bank services 
withdrawals  first by liquidating  b, and then by borrowing  pesos  from the 
central bank.  Hence  the commercial  bank cannot go bankrupt.  After all 
depositors  have  visited  the  commercial  bank,  the  central  bank  starts 
buying  pesos  back,  first with  the  dollars  bought  from  the  commercial 
bank,  and then  with  dollars obtained  from the liquidation  of the bank's 
long-term  assets.  If the central bank completely  runs out of assets while 
there are depositors  attempting  to exchange  pesos  for dollars,  it closes 
its window,  and we  say that there is a balance-of-payments  crisis. 
Somewhat  surprisingly,  this regime has essentially  the same outcomes 
as a currency  board.  There is an honest  equilibrium  that results  in the 
social  optimum  and in which  the emergency  credit line turns out to be 
unnecessary.  But also there is a balance-of-payments  crisis equilibrium if 
and  only  if  the  same  illiquidity  condition  (6)  holds.  In  a balance-of- 
payments  crisis,  all  depositors  attempt  to  withdraw  i  pesos  and  ex- 
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all of its assets  and has  to close  its window.  To see  that this  can be  an 
equilibrium,  suppose  that all depositors  withdraw  i pesos  and attempt to 
exchange  them for dollars at the central bank. To honor its exchange-rate 
commitment,  the  central  bank  will  have  b dollars  obtained  from  the 
commercial bank; in addition,  it can raise rk  more dollars from exercising 
its right to liquidate  the long-term  asset.  So the central bank will not be 
able to honor  its commitment  if i exceeds  the resulting  sum,  b +  rk;  but 
this is precisely  the international  illiquidity condition  (6). 
The intuition is that, with fixed exchange  rates, the ability of the central 
bank to act as a lender  of last resort is limited  by the  extent  of its own 
international  liquidity.  While  the  central bank can print pesos  freely, it 
cannot print dollars. With fixed rates each peso is a potential dollar liabili- 
ties  liability, and  a balance-of-payments  crisis  occurs  when  depositors 
realize that the central bank's potential dollar exceed its liquidation value. 
It is remarkable that,  under  fixed exchange  rates,  the possibility  of a 
crisis  depends  only  on  the  underlying  international  illiquidity  of  the 
economy.  It does  not  depend  on  whether  the  central  bank  acts  as  a 
lender  of  last  resort,  which  only  determines  how  the  crisis  becomes 
manifest: as a bank failure or as a currency collapse. 
8.3 FLEXIBLE  EXCHANGE  RATES 
If the combination  of fixed rates and potentially  unstable  rates seems  to 
be dangerous,  what  about a regime  in which  the central bank acts as a 
lender of last resort but allows  exchange  rates to be flexible? The easiest 
way  to model  this situation  is to retain the assumptions  of the previous 
subsection,  except  that there is no line at the central bank. Instead,  the 
exchange  rate is determined,  after depositors  have  visited  the commer- 
cial bank, by an auction  in which  the central bank offers some  amounts 
of reserves  and depositors  offer their holdings  of pesos. 
To be  concrete,  suppose  that  in  period  1 the  central  bank  fixes  its 
supply  of dollars  at the  auction  at b =  Ai, the  amount  of dollars previ- 
ously  bought  from  the  commercial  bank.  Then,  if Ar is the  fraction  of 
depositors  withdrawing  i in period  1, equality  of supply  and demand  in 
the auction amounts  to 
Ari =  EAi, 
where  E is the exchange  rate (pesos  per dollar). It follows  that E =  Ar/A: 
naturally, pesos  lose  value  if more  depositors  withdraw  i in period  1. 
What are the outcomes  of this regime? It should  be intuitively  obvious 
that honesty  is still an equilibrium.  Indeed,  if only unlucky  agents with- 
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individually  rational for lucky depositors  not to withdraw  early. Hence, 
flexible rates may implement  the socially  optimal  allocation. 
But now  a run cannot occur. To see this, notice that for a run to occur, Ar 
must  exceed  A; hence  E must  be  greater than  1. By withdrawing  i and 
absconding,  a lucky depositor  can consume  i/E < i. But it can be shown46 
that the  bank  will  be  able to pay  the  promised  t to each  of the  1 -  Ar 
epositors  that do not run.  Hence  it cannot be optimal  for lucky deposi- 
tors to participate in a run. 
In short,  flexible rates implement  the social optimum  uniquely. In this 
model,  dropping  the  commitment  to  a fixed  exchange  rate allows  the 
central bank  to provide  assistance  to the  commercial  bank in case  of a 
run, and at the same time prevent  the inefficient  liquidation  of the long- 
run assets  of the economy.  The latter ensures  that domestic  deposits  will 
ultimately  be  honored,  while  the  accompanying  devaluation  punishes 
early withdrawals.  Rational depositors  will then understand  that it does 
not pay to run. 
In a situation  of potential  for bank runs, flexible exchange  rates appear 
to be  a mechanism  superior  to  fixed  rates.  But there  are a number  of 
qualifications  to this statement.  It applies  only to a regime  of floating,  not 
to the sudden  depreciation  that typically happens  when  the authorities 
throw in the towel.  And flexible rates "work" only if complemented  by the 
appropriate monetary policy: in particular, the central bank must be will- 
ing to act as a lender of last resort. 
These  results  also  depend  crucially on  the  assumption  that deposits 
must be paid in pesos.  If there are no local currency claims, movements 
in  the  nominal  exchange  rate  cannot  affect  their  real value.  This  is  a 
reason  to discourage,  as Sachs (1997) has advocated,  the "dollarization" 
of  deposits.  Notice  that  flexible  rates  cannot  help  in  dealing  with  the 
panics  of foreign  creditors,  since  in practice  foreign  loans  are denomi- 
nated in foreign currency. The key operational  question  then is what are 
the  proportions  of  foreign  (dollar) and  local (peso)  claims  on  the  local 
bank.  If the  latter  are  a  sufficiently  large  share,  flexible  rates  can  be 
stabilizing. 
9. And the  Rest  of the  World? 
We have  tried to provide  what  Feldstein  (1999) terms "a self-help  guide 
for emerging  markets."  When  analyzing  the  effect  of different  policies 
46. To see this, note  that in period  2 the bank will have  (1 -  A)Rk  dollars available from its 
illiquid investments.  Now,  (1  A)Rk  -  (1 -  Ar) = (1 -  A)(Rk  -  t) + (Ar  -  A)O  > 0, which 
means  that the bank will be able to pay the promised  e to each of the 1 -  Ar  agents that 
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on  illiquidity  and  the  potential  for crises,  we  have  asked  not  what  the 
world  can  do  for emerging  economies,  but  what  each  emerging  econ- 
omy can do for itself. 
But this does  not mean  that the rest of the world  is off the hook.  We 
have  seen  that the  trade-offs  faced by  countries  are unattractive  and  a 
policy  regime,  however  stringent,  is almost  always  vulnerable  to a col- 
lapse  of confidence  by domestic  and foreign  investors.  This means  that 
there is much  room  for what  is nowadays  known  as the  world  financial 
architecture  to help nations  help  themselves. 
The absence of an effective  international lender of last resort is particu- 
larly serious.  If financial  crises  such  as those  in East Asia  were  at least 
partially caused by self-fulfilling  liquidity squeezes  on banks, an interna- 
tional  lender  of last resort has  a positive  role in overcoming  a financial 
system's  international  illiquidity. Funds from abroad to prevent unneces- 
sary credit crunches  and  avoid  costly  liquidation  of investment  can in- 
crease welfare. 
The usual  (and valid) objection is moral hazard. But this need  not be a 
rationale  for policy  paralysis.  Fire insurance  and bank deposit  guaran- 
tees  also risk inducing  moral hazard,  but the risk can be minimized  by 
proper  contract design  and  appropriate  monitoring.  No  one  advocates 
banning  fire insurance  simply  because  it leads  some  homeowners  to be 
careless  with  their  fireplaces.  The  same  should  be  true  of  an interna- 
tional lender of last resort. 
Appendix 
A.1 AUTARKY 
Consider  a depositor  who  attempts  to maximize  long-run  consumption, 
acting in isolation.  She can, in period 0, borrow up to her credit limit and 
divide  her  total  resources,  w  a  + f,  between  the  liquid  and  illiquid 
assets.  Thus she faces the constraint  (1) in the text. 
We assume  that it is optimal for initial investment  in liquid assets to be 
enough  to finance  i. This requires 
A(R -  r)w  -  [R -  (1  -  A)]i,  (32) 
which  we  assume.  In that case we have 
b=i,  (33) 
since  R >  1 implies  that the depositor  cannot profit from holding  more 
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correspondingly,  k =  w  -  i. In that case,  the  agent's  consumption  will 
be Rk +  b -  f if lucky and Rk -  f if not,  which  implies  that her expected 
consumption  will be 
=  A(Rk-f)  +  (1 -  A)(Rk +  b-f)=  R(w-  i) +  (1 -  A)i-f.  (34) 
A.2 SHORT-TERM  DEBT 
Consider,  first, the case of risk neutrality. As argued in the text, for small 
p the  problem  reduces  to the  determination  of c. But the maximand  in 
(18) is 
(1 -  p)[Rk -  (1 +  r)ds -  (1 + r,)(f -  ds)] + pqi 
=  (1 -  p)Rk -  (1 -  p)(l  +  rs)ds  -  (f -  ds) + pqi 
=  (1 -  p)Rk -f  + pq[(l +  r,)d, +  i] 
=  (1 -  p)Rk -f+  p(b +  rk), 
where  the first equality follows  from the definition  of r,, the second  from 
(17), and the third from the definition  of q. It follows  that the value of c is 
the same  for all ds in [0, f],  as claimed in the text. 
Consider  now  the case of risk aversion.  For p small,  the bank's prob- 
lem is to maximize 
(1 -  p)u(c) + pqu(i)  (35) 
subject to (17), (16), 
k + b  a + ds + d, 
d, + dl  f, 
Ai c  b, 
c +  (1 +  rs)d, +  (1 + r)dl <  Rk +  b -  Ai, 
and  incentive  constraints.  The  function  u is  assumed  to be  strictly  in- 
creasing,  strictly concave,  and continuously  differentiable,  and to satisfy 
u(O) =  0, u' (0) = oo. 
This is a standard constrained  maximization  problem,  and the Kuhn- 
Tucker theorem  applies.  The first-order conditions  for this problem  can 
be written  as 
(1 -  p)u'(c) = 
Ao -  0 -  ^(1  + rs)  [()+  q[p(i)  +  1  + r)p]  0,  =0  if  ds >  0, 
ro  -  0-  F2(1 +  rl)  0,  =0  if  d  >  0, 
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-Io  +  iL  +  I2  +  q[pu(i)  +  y(1  +  rs)p] =  0, 
y(1 -  p  +  pq) =  u2ds  +  q2[pu(i) +  y(l  +  rs)p], 
k+  b = e +f=  w, 
c +  (1 + rs)ds  +  (1 + r,)dl = Rk +  b -  Ai, 
Ai c  b, = b  if  AL  >  0, 
ds + d  =f, 
where  q = q(b, rs, ds)  is given by (16) and 0, y, and the ju's  are nonnegative 
Lagrange multipliers.  To simplify  notation,  we have  assumed  that r = 0; 
this is not essential  as long as r is sufficiently  small. 
The interested  reader can now  verify  that there is a solution  of these 
conditions  such  that d, = f and ds =  0. The key part is to check the first 
inequality  in the preceding  set; one may proceed  as follows.  If dt = f > 0, 
then /LO  -  0 = At2(1  + ri). Also,  if ds = 0, the fourth equality above yields  y 
=  0. Using  these  facts, the inequality  in question  reduces  to 
pu(i) 
2(r, -  rs) -  q(1  +  rs) -  ,  0,  (36)  i 
which,  after using  (17) and  2 =  (1 -  p)u'(c), reduces  to u'(c) < u(i)/i. But 
this must hold,  by the assumptions  on u and the fact that c-  i. 
Finally, assume  again risk neutrality, but suppose  that there are many 
banks  that take r,, not  (17), as given.  The reasoning  at the beginning  of 
this appendix  implies  that each bank must choose  ds to maximize 
b+rk 
(1 -  p)Rk -  (1 -  p)(l  + rs)(ds  -  (f -  d,) + p i  (  d i.  (37) 
z +  (1 + r,)d, 
Let F(ds)  denote  the above expression,  as a function  of d,. Now, 
piq 
F'(d)  =  -(1  -  p)(l  +  r,) +  1 -  +  (1 + rs).  (38) 
i +  (1 +  rs)d, 
In equilibrium,  (17) must hold,  and inserting  it in the above expression, 
we  obtain 
(1 +  r,)d, 
F'(d)  = pq(l  +  r)  (1 +  )d  (39)  I + (1 + r,)ds 
The above  expression  is greater than zero for any d, >  0. This implies 
that  ds = f  is  an  equilibrium,  and  that  it is  the  only  equilibrium  with 56 *  CHANG & VELASCO 
positive  d,. Finally, ds cannot be zero in equilibrium.  While the first-order 
condition  (39) equals zero at d, = 0, we have F" > 0 for all ds, as the reader 
can verify from (38). Hence  ds = 0 is a local minimum  of F. 
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ABHIJIT  V. BANERJEE 
Massachusetts  Institute  of Technology 
This paper  does  three  things:  First, it builds  a model  of bank liquidity 
that is relevant  for international  lending;  it accomplishes  this by adapt- 
ing the model  of Diamond  and Dybvig  (1983) to recognize  the fact that 
the  assets  and  liabilities  of  the  banking  sector,  and  hence  its  liquidity 
position,  are affected by real-exchange-rate  movements.  Second,  it uses 
that model  to argue that there is a potentially  nasty  interaction between 
banking  crises and real-exchange-rate  movements:  The basic idea is that 
a banking  crisis increases  the likelihood  of a real depreciation  because  it 
leads  to a credit crunch,  which  in turn leads  to  a fall in  the  output  of 
tradable goods.  At the same  time,  a real depreciation  leads  to a loss  of 
value in the nontradable  sector, which increases the likelihood  of a bank- 
ing  crisis  (since,  by  assumption,  loans  to the  nontradable  sector  are a 
part of the bank's more liquid assets).  Third, the paper uses  the model to 
analyze  a host of policies.  In particular, it emphasizes  that this view  of a 
banking  crisis relies on real rather than nominal  factors and is substan- 
tially independent  of the exchange-rate  regime  and the denomination  of 
the debt. 
What makes  the paper  very  useful  is that it does  all this  in a simple 
and transparent model,  which  is nevertheless  rich enough  to allow, for a 
wide  range of policy  experiments.  Whether  or not  one  agrees  with  the 
specific  conclusions  of  the  model,  it is  clear that Chang  and  Velasco's 
analysis  sets  a new  standard  for open-economy  macro  models  of  this 
class.  That being  said,  I must  also  say  that  I have  some  reservations 
about  the  modeling  approach.  Most  importantly,  the  paper  says  little 
about  what  is  special  about  liquidity  in  an  international  context.  The 
international  part of the model  comes  from the fact that movements  in 
the real exchange  rate matter; but, as far as I can see, nothing  fundamen- 
tal in the model  would  be altered if we  assumed  a closed  economy  and 
looked  at the effect of changes  in some  other relative price. 
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We clearly need  better arguments  for why  the international  context is 
important  from the point  of view  of liquidity. For example,  being  a part 
of the world  capital market may enhance  liquidity because  it is easier to 
sell  the  bank's  assets  when  the  bank  needs  cash.  On  the  other  hand, 
depositors  and lenders  in an open  economy  may be more footloose,  so 
that it is easier to induce  a liquidity crisis. More could also be done  here 
to link country characteristics to the liquidity of the banking  system.  For 
example,  people  are reluctant to lend long-term  to developing  countries 
because  they  feel  that there  is more  policy  uncertainty,  or because  the 
level  of macroeconomic  volatility  may be higher. 
As  a final point  on modeling  issues:  This paper  follows  the work by 
Diamond and Dybvig in taking demand deposit contracts as the only form 
of the banking  contract. In principle,  of course,  banks  could have  other 
contracts with depositors  where the probability of being able to withdraw 
depends,  for example,  on the bank's liquidity position.  There is, however, 
a more recent literature arguing that the demand  deposit  contract may be 
optimal  precisely  because  it makes banks  fragile, which  improves  their 
incentives  (Calomiris  and  Kahn,  1991; Diamond  and  Rajan,  1998)- 
although  it is not clear that these  arguments  go through  once one  takes 
account of the knock-on  effects on the rest of the economy.1 
Turning  next  to  the  specific  story  told  in  the  paper  about  how  a 
banking-currency  crisis comes  about, it is worth noting  that the story is 
quite  sensitive  to the  details  of the  model.  For example,  if most  of the 
borrowing  were  in the nontraded-good  sector (the opposite  of what  the 
paper  assumes),  then  a banking  crisis would  lead  to real appreciation. 
And  if banks depend  on the profits of the traded-good  sector to remain 
liquid  and  able to  finance  the  nontraded-good  sector  (once  again,  the 
opposite  of what the paper assumes),  a real appreciation would  actually 
make the banks weaker and bring on a crisis. Alternatively,  if nontraded 
goods  are inputs  into the production  of traded goods,  then a real appre- 
ciation leads  to a squeeze  on firm profits, which  in turn could lead to a 
banking  crisis, as all the firms draw on their credit lines.2 Unfortunately 
there is not much reliable evidence  about what happens  to real exchange 
rates around  the time of a crisis. The little that is known  seems  ambigu- 
ous  for this  story: Although  there is usually  both  a real and a nominal 
depreciation  in the course of a banking crisis, typically there is also a real 
1. My sense is that  the arguments  will go through  because  individual  banks  do not internal- 
ize the effects on the rest of the economy. In other words, banks will choose to be more 
fragile  than is socially optimal. This does however raise an interesting  set of questions 
about  banking  regulation. 
2. A related  argument  is in Aghion, Bacchetta,  and Banerjee  (1998). 60 *  BANERJEE 
appreciation  in the runup to a crisis. What this model  makes clear is that 
we  really  need  more  empirical  research:  We  need  to  know  whether 
exchange  rates  move  in  the  direction  predicted  by  the  model  and 
whether  they  move  enough  to  cause  a banking  crisis.  The  latter also 
requires us to find out more about the term structure of bank lending  to 
the tradable and nontradable  sectors. 
It is possible,  however,  to capture some  of the flavor of the results  in 
the paper without  putting  as much weight  on the tradable-nontradable 
distinction.  The key assumptions  of such a model  are: 
1.  Within  a  national  market,  price  adjustments  take  time.  It is  well 
known  that the convergence  to purchasing-power  parity is extremely 
slow.  For example,  Giacomelli  (1998) estimates  that it takes  at least 
two years. 
2.  Nominal-exchange-rate  adjustments  are instantaneous. 
3.  Many  developing-country  firms  borrow  abroad  in  dollars  but  pro- 
duce for the domestic  market. 
In the world  described by these  assumptions,  a nominal  depreciation 
hurts borrowers,  which  in turn can lead to a run on the banking system. 
The resulting  contraction  in credit leads  to a fall in output.  The fall in 
output,  given  the right assumption  about money  demand,  can lead to a 
nominal  depreciation.  In other words,  an expectation  of a currency cum 
banking  crisis can be self-confirming. 
This  mechanism,  while  superficially  quite  similar  to  the  mechanism 
proposed  by Chang  and Velasco, has a number  of quite different policy 
implications.  Specifically,  policies  directed  jointly  towards  the nominal 
exchange  rate and the banking  sector become  very important.  For exam- 
ple,  a relaxed monetary stance,  in a situation in which  a currency crisis is 
threatened,  may ease  the pressure  on the banks.  This in turn allows  the 
economy  to avoid  the credit crunch and the fall in output,  thereby  stav- 
ing off the currency crisis (see Aghion,  Bacchetta, and Banerjee, 1999, for 
a formalization).  These  different  implications  again  underscore  the  im- 
portance of more empirical work. We need to determine  whether  real- or 
nominal-exchange-rate  effects are central to most crises. 
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1. Introduction 
This is a very interesting  and important paper, both in its positive  results 
and  in its normative  implications.  I am sure that it will be widely  read 
and discussed.  The main conclusion  of the paper is simple: In an open 
economy  where  short-term  assets  are large relative  to central-bank re- 
serves,  self-fulfilling  international  bank  runs  are a serious  possibility. 
Unlike a closed economy,  where  the central bank can respond  to a run by 
printing  domestic  money  and  serving  as  a lender  of  last  resort,  in  an 
open  economy  the central bank is limited by its stock of foreign reserves 
and may not be able to prevent  a run. A way to avoid such bank runs in 
an open  economy  is to have  an international  lender of last resort (ILLR) 
which  is willing  to provide  unlimited  resources  to prevent  an irrational 
bank panic. 
While the authors stress modeling  the "bank" aspects  of a run, a self- 
fulfilling  financial and exchange-rate  crisis may also be triggered by the 
refusal  of domestic  and  foreign  investors  to  roll over  other  short-term 
assets,  such  as  a  country's  public  debt.  Indeed,  many  authors  have 
already  emphasized  the  possibility  of  such  self-fulfilling  public-debt 
runs in models  with  multiple  equilibria. 
The authors also analyze  a number  of other interesting  issues,  includ- 
ing:  (1)  the  relative  likelihood  of  bank  runs  under  fixed  and  flexible 
exchange  rates; (2) the determinants  of the probability of a run; (3) why 
debt is short-term in spite of the fact that this increases  the possibility  of 
a bank  run; (4) the  risks  of  financial  liberalization  and  arguments  for 
capital controls; (5) the links between  government  debt and deficits and 
runs on the public debt. 
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2.  International  Bank  Runs  and  the  Needfor  an 
International  Lender  of Last  Resort 
The usual rationale  for an ILLR  for countries  that experience an attack  in 
spite of their good economic policies is based on the possibility of interna- 
tional  bank  runs.  This paper formalizes  this rationale  in a very elegant and 
interesting way. The model presented here is a version of Diamond and 
Dybvig's (1983)  model of bank runs, expanded to address a number of 
new issues that are specific to an open economy. 
Currency crises are formally analogous to, but more complex than, 
domestic bank runs. In a domestic context, depositors of a bank may 
suddenly lose confidence in the institution and seek to withdraw their 
funds en masse. In the face of a bank run, even a well-run bank will 
quickly exhaust its  cash reserves. Since most bank investments are 
illiquid, the attempt to liquidate them prematurely will diminish their 
value. As a result, even strong banks can fail if a bank run occurs. And 
the failure of one bank can cause runs on others. This is the main mes- 
sage of the seminal Diamond-Dybvig model of bank runs. 
Given the pivotal role that banks play within all modern economies, 
most governments provide deposit insurance  to discourage  bank runs as 
well as lender of last resort (LLR)  facilities to assure banks ample access 
to liquidity.  In addition, governments frequently rescue troubled finan- 
cial institutions that are deemed "too big to fail,"  in order to mitigate the 
potential economic consequences of their bankruptcy. 
Chang and Velasco extend the Diamond-Dybvig model to an open 
economy in order consider the possibility of international  bank runs. In 
an open economy, with unrestricted  capital  markets,  domestic banks are 
free to accept deposits from both domestic and foreign residents, in both 
domestic and foreign currency.  In considering currency  crises, however, 
other domestic institutions also have to be included. In general, any 
financial institution that issues  short-term liabilities that can be con- 
verted into foreign currency  can play a role in a currency  crisis. 
As in a closed economy, these liabilities are used primarily to fund 
longer-term, illiquid investments that cannot be readily converted to 
cash. If bank depositors-both  foreign and domestic-seek  to exchange 
their claims on financial institutions for foreign currency, an interna- 
tional bank run can result. In such an event, a rapid loss of reserves and 
extreme strain on the exchange rate are likely to ensue.  The Korean 
experience in October 1997  suggests that such an outcome is more likely 
in the presence of large amounts of highly volatile short-term  liabilities, 
such as interbank  loans from foreign banks. 
The provision of liquidity in a currency  crisis  poses a problem  not faced Comment 63 
in  domestic  bank  runs.  Both  types  of  crisis  begin  with  a widespread 
attempt to convert short-term claims into currency. In a closed  economy, 
the central bank can satisfy these claims by issuing (in principle) an unlim- 
ited supply  of domestic currency. In an open economy,  on the other hand, 
the central bank can only provide  foreign currency up to the extent of its 
stock of foreign reserves.  Since all short-term domestic  currency assets of 
the  country  (not just  dollar deposits  in banks)  can in principle  be con- 
verted into foreign currency during an attack, the domestic  central bank 
may not be able to cover all potential claims. It is this fact that suggests  the 
potential  benefits  of a precautionary facility for countries  that have been 
unjustifiably  hit by financial contagion. 
In a closed  economy,  a bank run can be ruled out with  deposit  insur- 
ance and access to the central-bank discount  window.  In an open  econ- 
omy, the central bank may not have enough  reserves  to provide  the LLR 
function; hence  the potential  need  for an ILLR. 
3.  Causes  of the  Asian  Crisis' 
Before discussing  in more detail the positive  and empirical implications 
of the paper, it is useful  to briefly assess  the basic view  of the paper that 
the Asian crisis can be understood  and explained  in terms of the idea of 
an international bank run. 
The issue  of whether  the Asian  crisis and other recent crisis episodes 
(Mexico,  Russia,  Brazil, Rumania,  South  Africa,  Czech  Republic)  were 
due to fundamentals  or self-fulfilling  multiple equilibria (such as an inter- 
national  bank run) is very  important  for the  policy  implications  of the 
paper,  viz.,  the need  for an ILLR. As we  will discuss  in detail below,  if 
crises  are  triggered  by  fundamentals,  the  case  for  an  ILLR is  much 
weaker  and an ILLR might actually be counterproductive. 
The  class  of  models  with  multiple  equilibria  (international-bank-run 
models,  herd-behavior  models,  self-fulfilling  panic  models)  represents 
one  set of explanations  of the crisis (see  also Sachs and Radelet,  1998a, 
b). While these models  differ in many important details,  they are in spirit 
very similar in that they are all multiple-equilibrium  models. 
The main alternative  explanation  of the crisis (see  Krugman,  1998) is 
based  on the idea  that implicit and explicit  government  guarantees,  to- 
gether  with  connected  and  directed  lending,  led  to moral hazard,  i.e., 
excessive  international  borrowing  by  domestic  banks  and  lending  to 
risky and unprofitable investment  projects (see Krugman, 1998; Corsetti, 
1. The  discussion  in  this  section  follows  Corsetti,  Pesenti,  and  Roubini  (1998,  1999a, 
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Pesenti,  and Roubini,  1998, 1999a, 1999b; and McKinnon and Pill, 1990). 
The investment  boom  led to large and growing  current-account  deficits 
that were  financed  primarily through  the  accumulation  of a large stock 
of  short-term,  foreign-currency-denominated,  and  unhedged  liabilities 
by  the  banking  system.  While  actual  budget  deficits  were  apparently 
low, the implicit and explicit government  guarantees  of a bailout  of the 
financial  system  in a crisis implied  large and growing  unfunded  public 
liabilities that emerged  once  the currency crisis triggered  a wider  bank- 
ing crisis. 
At first sight,  the view  that the crisis was  not due  to fundamentals  is 
supported  by  the  fact  that  the  Asian  countries  did  not  fit  traditional 
models  of economies  prone  to currency  and  financial  crises.  Currency 
and  debt  crises  in  the  past  (as,  for example,  in  Latin America  in  the 
1980s) typically  occurred in countries sharing several common  character- 
istics, including  large public deficits and debt, high inflation as a result of 
deficit monetization,  low  economic  growth,  and low  saving  and invest- 
ment  rates. In Asia,  in contrast,  the crisis-afflicted  countries had experi- 
enced  low  budget  deficits,  low  public  debt,  single-digit  inflation  rates, 
high  economic  growth,  and high  saving  and investment  rates. 
The absence  of the macroeconomic  imbalances  typical of past crises is 
the reason why  some  academic studies  have argued that the Asian crisis 
was  due not to structural weaknesses.  The "usual suspects"  of currency 
crisis  did  not  show  up  in  Asia.  These  authors  (including  Chang  and 
Velasco)  argue  that  the  crisis  represented  an  essentially  irrational but 
nevertheless  self-fulfilling  panic,  akin  to  a  bank  run,  fueled  by  hot 
money  and fickle international  investors. 
Although  the crisis might  have been  exacerbated by speculative  capi- 
tal flight, an alternative view  (Corsetti, Pesenti,  and Roubini 1998, 1999a, 
1999b) is  that,  along  with  their  many  strong  economic  fundamentals, 
East Asian  crisis countries  also possessed  some  severe  structural distor- 
tions and institutional  weaknesses,  especially  in their financial systems. 
These  vulnerabilities  eventually  triggered  the  crisis  in  the  summer  of 
1997. In particular, the financial sectors of the crisis countries were prone 
to fragility due  to the prevalence  of corrupt credit practices, loans  often 
being politically directed to favored firms and sectors. In addition,  regula- 
tion  and  supervision  of  crisis-country  banking  systems  were  notably 
weak.  Moreover,  moral hazard derived  from implicit  or explicit govern- 
ment  bailout  guarantees  of  financial  institutions.  Such  financial-sector 
weaknesses  contributed  to a lending  boom  and overinvestment  in proj- 
ects and sectors that often were risky and of low profitability, such as real 
estate  and  other  nontraded  sectors;  excessive  capacity  accumulated  in 
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assets  in  fixed  supply  fed  an  asset  price bubble,  with  equity  and  real 
estate prices rising beyond  levels  warranted by fundamentals.  Poor cor- 
porate governance  and what  has now  come  to be called  "crony capital- 
ism"  exacerbated  the  distortions  in  this  system  and  fueled  the  invest- 
ment  boom.  Domestic  and international  capital liberalization  may have 
aggravated  the original distortions  by allowing  banks  and firms to bor- 
row more and at lower rates in international  capital markets. 
In spite  of high  saving  rates,  the  excessive  investment  boom  in  the 
East  Asian  region  led  to  large  and  growing  current-account  deficits, 
financed  primarily  through  the  accumulation  of  short-term,  foreign 
currency-denominated,  and unhedged  liabilities by the banking system. 
Exchange-rate regimes entailing  semifixed  pegs to the dollar exacerbated 
the problem  in two  ways.  First, they  led to real currency appreciations 
(as a result  of the  1995-1998  appreciation  of the  dollar) that worsened 
current account deficits. Second,  the promise  of fixed exchange  rates led 
borrowers  to discount  the possibility  of future devaluation,  and thereby 
led them to underestimate  the cost of foreign capital. Also,  while budget 
deficits were  apparently  low, the implicit and explicit government  guar- 
antees  of a bailout  of the  financial  system  in a crisis implied  large and 
growing  unfunded  public liabilities that emerged  once the currency cri- 
sis triggered a wider banking  crisis. 
In Korea, excessive  investment  was concentrated  among the chaebols, 
the large conglomerates  dominating  the economy.  The chaebols'  control 
of financial  institutions,  together  with  government  policies  of directed 
lending  to favored  sectors,  led to excessive  and low-profitability  invest- 
ment  in  such  traded-goods  sectors  as  autos,  steel,  shipbuilding,  and 
semiconductors.  By early 1997, well  before  the onset  of the won  crisis, 
seven  out of the thirty main chaebols  were  effectively  bankrupt and the 
Korean economy  was mired in a deep recession.  High levels of corporate 
leverage  were  already prevalent  in 1996, well  before the currency crisis 
increased  the  burden  of  foreign  debt.  In  Korea,  the  average  debt-to- 
equity ratio of the top thirty chaebols was over 300% by the end of 1996; 
and by 1997 the return on invested  capital was below  the cost of capital 
for two-thirds  of the  top chaebols.  By early 1997, nonperforming  loans 
were  a high  15% of total loans. 
In Thailand,  regulations  restricted  entrance  into the banking  system, 
but this led to the growth  of unregulated,  nonbank  finance  companies. 
Excessive  borrowing  by  these  finance  companies  fueled  a boom  in the 
real restate sector. Liberalization of capital-account regulations,  for exam- 
ple  through  the  establishment  of  the  Bangkok  International  Banking 
Facility, led  Thai banks  and  firms to borrow  heavily  abroad, in foreign 
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that  had  borrowed  excessively  from  abroad  in  foreign  currency  were 
distressed  even  before  the  Thai baht crisis, and were  eventually  closed 
after the onset  of the crisis. 
In Indonesia,  a large  fraction of all bank credit consisted  of directed 
credit, channeled  to politically favored firms and sectors. Although  Indo- 
nesia  had  already  suffered  a  banking  crisis  in  the  early  1990s,  such 
practices  remained  prevalent.  Moreover,  most  of  the  borrowing  took 
place in foreign-currency  terms, compounding  debtors' inability to repay 
when  the  local  currency  depreciated.  In Indonesia,  a large  fraction of 
foreign  banks'  lending  was  directly  to the  corporate  sector rather than 
being  intermediated  through  the domestic  banking  system. 
Empirical studies  confirm that the return to capital fell sharply in the 
East Asia region as the result of this excessive  investment.  For example, 
Pomerleano  (1998) finds  a rapid buildup  of fixed assets  throughout  Asia 
between  1992 and 1996, with particularly rapid growth in Indonesia  and 
Thailand. Since most of the growth was financed with debt (especially  in 
Thailand  and  Korea),  high  levels  of  corporate  leverage  were  already 
prevalent  in 1996, well before the currency crisis increased the burden of 
foreign  debt.  At  the  same  time,  moderate  to low  profitability  severely 
impaired the ability of many  Asian  firms to meet their interest payment 
obligations. 
Exogenous  disturbances  contributed  to make the East Asian countries 
vulnerable  to  crisis.  These  included  a  slowdown  of  export  growth 
among  many  Asian  countries  in 1996 and  a worsening  of the  terms  of 
trade,  deriving  from  factors  including  a  slump  in  the  world  price  of 
semiconductors;  the  persistent  stagnation  of  the  Japanese  economy  in 
the 1990s; the weakness  of the yen,  which  caused  a real appreciation  of 
Asian currencies that were effectively  pegged  to the U.S.  dollar; and the 
emergence  of China as a major regional  competitor. 
In 1997, the bubble burst. Stock markets dropped  (in some cases accel- 
erating  a reversal  that had  started  before  1997), and  the  emergence  of 
wide  losses  and/or  outright  corporate  sector  defaults  revealed  the  low 
profitability  of past investment  projects.  Nonperforming  loans,  already 
on the rise prior to the currency crisis, escalated,  threatening  bankruptcy 
of many  East Asian  financial institutions.  In addition,  the firms, banks, 
and  investors  that had  heavily  relied  on  external  borrowing  were  left 
with a large stock of short-term, foreign-currency-denominated,  and un- 
hedged  foreign  debt  that  could  not  be  easily  repaid.  The  ensuing 
exchange-rate  crisis exacerbated  this problem,  as currency  depreciation 
dramatically increased  the domestic-currency  value  of the debt denomi- 
nated  in  foreign  currency,  provoking  further  financial  crisis  for banks 
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of firms, banks,  and investors  to cover their previously  unhedged  liabili- 
ties  in foreign  currency. Thus,  accelerated  depreciation  aggravated  the 
original foreign-currency  debt problem,  creating a vicious  circle. 
The concern  of private  investors  about governments'  commitment  to 
structural  reforms  exacerbated  the  policy  uncertainty,  contributing  to 
widespread  capital  outflows.  While  fundamentals  likely  triggered  the 
crisis,  currency  and  stock  markets  may  also  have  overreacted,  with 
panic, herd behavior, and a generalized  increase in risk aversion produc- 
ing a sudden  reversal of capital flows  that exacerbated  the crisis. 
If we  accept the "fundamentals"  explanation  of the Asian  crisis, then 
we must be skeptical of the ability of the theoretical analysis in the paper 
to explain the crisis. Moreover,  the main policy implication  of the paper, 
the need  for an ILLR, can also be seriously  questioned  if we believe  in a 
"fundamentals"  model.  I thus move  to discuss  in more detail the case for 
an ILLR. 
4. Problems  with  an ILLR 
Let us consider now  in more detail one of the main policy implications  of 
the paper, viz.,  the need  for an ILLR. In a domestic  context,  the LLR  role 
played  by  central banks  and  institutions  such  as  deposit  insurance  is 
aimed  at preventing  self-fulfilling  bank runs.  However,  such  insurance 
creates  moral-hazard  incentives:  If banks'  deposits  are insured  and/or 
liquidity  support  is guaranteed  in the case of a run, banks will have  an 
incentive  to make  more  risky loans  than  they  would  in the  absence  of 
insurance.  The solution  to this problem is strong capital adequacy  stan- 
dards and prudential  supervision  and regulation  of banks. 
In the international  context,  the expected  provision  of official liquidity 
may also lead to distorted  incentives:  Expectations  of official emergency 
financing may lead international investors to lend carelessly and domestic 
governments  to engage in risky policies.  Moral hazard in the international 
context can also be mitigated if insolvent banks can be distinguished  from 
illiquid ones.  Ideally, in the international context, precautionary financial 
support  should  be given  to countries  with  good  policies-innocent  by- 
standers in episodes  of contagion-and  be withheld  from countries with 
weak  policies.  Drawing  this distinction  is obviously  considerably  more 
difficult  among  countries  than  among  banks.  There  is  a  spectrum  of 
crises, from those that stem primarily from poor policies to those that stem 
primarily from contagion.  In practice, most fall somewhere  in the middle. 
A  regime  for crisis  response  should  provide  for some  combination  of 
financial assistance  and policy changes.  The provision  of large-scale offi- 
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should  be used  for access  to large-scale  assistance,  and on what  terms? 
How  should  it be linked  to private-sector  involvement?  And where  will 
the required resources  come from? 
However,  just  as there  is  a role  for the  government  to  intervene  to 
prevent  a domestic  financial crisis from destabilizing  the domestic  finan- 
cial system,  there is a role for the international  community  to intervene 
in  an  international  financial  crisis  to  help  limit  contagion  and  global 
instability.  The current crisis has demonstrated  that the official commu- 
nity  needs,  at times,  to be  able to provide  huge  financing  packages  to 
quell  potential  contagion  and  instability.  A proposed  new  IMF precau- 
tionary  facility  (the  Contingent  Credit  Line) allows  large-scale  interna- 
tional assistance  for those  cases  where  problems  stem more from conta- 
gion than from poor policies.  It may make sense  in today's world of large 
and sudden  liquidity needs  for more official money  than is provided  by 
traditional IMF programs  to be available up front in return for more up- 
front policy  changes. 
5. Are  Runs  Due to Self-Fulfilling  Equilibria 
or to Fundamentals? 
One  should  also be careful about pushing  the argument  that an ILLR is 
needed  to prevent  irrational, self-fulfilling  runs on a country. Even in a 
domestic  context,  while  a  purely  irrational  run  on  a healthy  bank  is 
possible  in theory, in reality all known  runs have occurred on banks that 
had  some  serious  fundamental  weaknesses.  Investors  are not irrational 
and do not attack banks just for the fun of it. The large literature on the 
causes  of  systemic  banking  crisis  confirms  that  crises  are  always  the 
outcome  of severe  problems  of the banking  system:  excessive  lending, 
high  levels  of  nonperforming  loans,  moral-hazard  distortions,  con- 
nected  and  directed  lending,  a  weak  macroeconomic  environment, 
poorly  designed  deposit  insurance,  weak  institutions,  or poorly  man- 
aged  liberalization  in the presence  of distorted  incentives  (see  Dziobek 
and  Pazarbasioglu,  1997; Honohan,  1997; Goldstein  and  Turner, 1996; 
Demirgtii-Kunt  and Detragiache,  1997; Caprio, 1998). 
Moreover, in technical terms, the multiple-equilibrium  literature is con- 
ceptually somewhat  weak in that, once an economy  is in the region where 
such bad equilibria may occur, nothing  in the model  explains why  inves- 
tors focus their expectations  on the bad equilibrium  rather than the good 
one.  Each outcome  is as likely as the other. Relying  on sunspots,  as this 
paper and others do, to nail down  the probability of a run is just a techni- 
cal solution  with  little economic  or empirical content.  In reality, instead, 
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fundamentals;  if fundamentals  are weak,  the probability that agents  at- 
tack is higher. In the bank context, it is weak banks that are attacked; solid, 
healthy  banks  are almost  never  attacked.  If one  takes  this  analogy  to 
countries,  then the message  is clear. It is unlikely  that a country that has 
good  fundamentals  would  be attacked,  save  for extreme  cases of conta- 
gion that such countries  should  be able to deal with on their own.  Coun- 
tries that are attacked are usually countries that, in some dimension  or the 
other, have weak fundamentals.  If that is the case, such countries should 
in general not prequalify for an ILLR  facility and would  therefore get little 
benefit from the existence of such a facility. For such countries,  traditional 
conditionality  or, at most,  a variant of it (e.g.,  early and substantial  dis- 
bursements  of funds  conditional  on a strong  fundamentals  adjustment) 
would  be the sensible  policy prescription. 
Moreover,  in a domestic  context,  the  moral-hazard  problems  created 
by deposit  insurance  and LLR support  are (or should  be) compensated 
with  strict regulation  and supervision  of the banking  system  and strong 
capital  adequacy  standards.  When  the  latter are not  effectively  imple- 
mented,  we  repeatedly  observe  systemic  bank crises that are very costly 
(fiscally  and in terms of the  output  loss  that a financial  crisis triggers). 
However,  in the  international  context  sovereignty  implies  that we  can- 
not directly regulate an economy  or impose  capital adequacy  standards. 
The most  we  can do  is to give  some  incentives  for good  behavior  and 
expect  countries  to follow  them.  This means  that the  carrot of an ILLR 
cannot  be  directly  linked,  as  in  the  domestic  context,  to  the  sticks  of 
regulation  of banks or countries.  The best that one can do is to design  an 
ILLR facility available  to countries  that qualify  on  the basis  of some  ex 
ante criteria. 
6. Private-Sector  Bail-in  and  ILLR 
One  important  question  in recent debates  on financial  architecture has 
been  how  to constructively  bail in rather than bail out private  (foreign) 
investors.  The general  issue  is the  one  of how  to constructively  ensure 
private-sector  involvement  in  crisis  prevention  and  resolution  and  in 
burden  sharing.  Some  concerns  have  been  expressed  that  large  IMF 
rescue  packages  may  be  used  to  bail  out  rather  than  bail  in  private 
creditors.  Indeed,  in Asia  in 1997-1998  official financing  effectively  re- 
placed part of the private capital that fled the region. 
In this context,  an important  issue  is whether  an ILLR will clash with 
the  objective  of having  private-sector  involvement  in crisis prevention 
and resolution.  Specifically, if an ILLR will automatically bail out inves- 
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that would  not  distinguish  countries  that may  be  deserving  uncondi- 
tional  ILLR support  from those  that have  weak  fundamentals  and  de- 
serve  support  only  subject to traditional IMF conditionality  would  have 
perverse  effects.  Countries  that should  not be bailed  out would  be,  and 
there would  be no room for constructive  bail-in of private investors. 
There are many (some controversial)  suggestions  on how  to bail in the 
private sectors,  differing  in their degree  of coercion.  These include 
1.  Collective  action clauses  to allow  orderly workouts 
2.  Moral suasion  to ensure  rollover of loans and bonds 
3.  Rollover options  in loan and debt contracts 
4.  Capital controls on outflows  (or inflows) 
5.  Private  contingent  credit  facilities  (as  in  Mexico,  Argentina,  In- 
donesia) 
6.  Conditioning  public  ILLR on  the  existence  of  private  contingent 
credit lines 
7.  Conditioning  sovereign  debt  rescheduling  by  official  creditors  on 
rescheduling  by private-sector  creditors, including  bondholders 
8.  Domestic  and foreign  debt restructuring 
9.  Debt service  suspensions  sanctioned  by the IMF and supported  by 
the IMF policy  of "lending into arrears" 
10.  Orderly debt workout  procedures 
To see why  an ILLR  may conflict with the goal of bailing in the private 
sector, consider  one problem  posed  by the Asian  crisis and by previous 
financial  crisis  episodes:  Once  a  financial  crisis  occurs,  usually  cross- 
border interbank loans end up being guaranteed  ex post, even if they were 
not  ex ante. For example,  in Korea,  all foreign  liabilities  of the  private 
banking  system  were  guaranteed  by  the  government  after  the  crisis 
erupted,  as a condition  for getting the rollover, and eventual  stretching of 
maturities,  on such interbank liabilities.  In Thailand, foreign liabilities of 
the  bankrupt  finance  companies  were  similarly  guaranteed  ex post. In 
general,  one of the lessons  of Asia may be that, given concerns about the 
stability of the banking  system,  creditor banks engaging  in cross-border 
interbank loans were not bailed in but rather bailed out. 
In a domestic  context,  the logic  of guaranteeing  deposits  is based  on 
the idea that small depositors  do not have the resources to monitor what 
the bank is doing  with  their deposits.  To avoid irrational panic,  we  thus 
insure  their deposits.  The same  does  not hold  for large investors,  who 
can and should  be careful about the actions of banks that are borrowing 
funds.  That is why  there are limits to the amount  of deposit  insurance. 
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domestic  banking  system  should  be insured.  More specifically,  since  a 
large fraction of the  foreign-currency  liabilities  of commercial  banks  in 
emerging  markets  are short-term  cross-border  interbank loans,  there is 
no  good  reason  why  such  large investors  should  be insured.  In reality, 
even  without  formal  insurance,  such  liabilities  have  often  ended  up 
being  insured  ex post, exacerbating moral-hazard issues. 
Now,  if  we  believe  that  "no  guarantee  of  foreign  liabilities  of  the 
banks"  is  a worthwhile  policy  objective,  then  it  is  important  that  an 
extensive  ILLR facility  might  undermine  that  effort.  If a country  can 
borrow  from such  a facility, international  investors  (as well  as domestic 
ones)  can be sure that they  can liquidate  their positions  in the banking 
and  financial  system  of emerging  markets  with  no  loss,  assuming  the 
exchange  rate remains fixed. Even under flexible exchange  rates the loss 
would  be limited, because  a country that dips into that facility will do so 
to use the funds  to limit currency depreciation  and thus allow investors/ 
depositors  who  do  want  to get  out to do  so effectively  risk-free. Then, 
how  can  we  design  an  ILLR facility  that  does  not  lead  to  implicit  or 
explicit bailouts  of interbank cross-border loans? There is no simple  an- 
swer, and we may end up exacerbating the moral-hazard problem rather 
than mitigating  it. 
How  would  an ILLR enhance  the  objective  of making  sure  that the 
private sector participates constructively  to crisis prevention  and resolu- 
tion? One simple,  but mistaken,  argument  would  be that since a full and 
credible ILLR would  prevent  international  bank runs from occurring in 
the first place,  there is no issue  with  having  to bail in private investors. 
Such investors  will not rush to the door if they  know  they  are insured. 
Reality is,  of course more complex,  as countries  with  fundamentals  out 
of  line  will  not  and  should  not  get  unlimited  and  unconditional  re- 
sources.  If they did, the funds  lent by an ILLR  facility would  be used  by 
domestic  and  foreign  investors  to  liquidate  domestic  assets  and  turn 
them into foreign  ones,  eventually  exacerbating  a crisis driven by weak 
fundamentals.  This  is  also  the  reason  why,  in  a  domestic  context,  it 
would  be destabilizing  to give extensive  LLR support to banks that are in 
serious  financial distress  or bankrupt.  Giving more funds  to such banks 
leads to moral hazard, i.e.,  "gambling for redemption,"  as the S&L crisis 
and many  other episodes  suggest.  This is also why  the correct response 
of  a central  bank  to  a banking  crisis  caused  by  poor  behavior  of  the 
banking  system  is  to  provide  emergency  support  (to  avoid  panic)  in 
exchange  for a very  strict control of the financial  institution  under  dis- 
tress.  Bank managers  may be fired, the government  may take effective 
control of the distressed  banks,  and the bank may be eventually  closed 
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an international  context  the idea  of taking over countries,  closing  them 
down,  and  merging  them  with  others  is  obviously  meaningless,  the 
policy implications  are threefold.  A country in severe  distress because  of 
fundamental  weaknesses  should  not  receive  unconditional  ILLR sup- 
port: such  support  would  bail out  investors  and  eventually  fail to pre- 
vent  a crisis. Second,  if support has to be given  to provide  incentives  for 
reform  and  adjustment,  then  the  support  should  be  of  the  strict- 
conditionality  form  that  comes  with  IMF packages.  Third,  to  bail  in 
private  investors,  the  amount  of  support  should  be  lower  than  the 
amount  of total domestic  assets  that could be potentially  converted  into 
foreign  currency,  i.e.,  official  financing  support  should  be  partial,  for 
otherwise  investors  end  up being  fully bailed  out.  Note  also  that even 
countries  that may  prequalify  for some  ILLR support  would  not  have 
access  to  unlimited  funds:  realistically,  such  a facility  would  not  have 
enough  funds  to fully finance all potential  cases of a bank run. 
Recent research also suggests  that there are many complex  issues  and 
difficulties  in designing  a system  that provides  official support  while  at 
the  same  time  constructively  bailing  in the private  sector. Three recent 
studies  (Jeanne,  1999; Zettelmeyer,  1999; and Goldfajn and Valdes, 1999) 
show the problems with designing  an ILLR  while ensuring private-sector 
bail-ins.  For example,  consider  the  implication  of  the  fact that the  re- 
sources available to an ILLR  will be limited,  so that partial rather than full 
bailout will be the norm. If the amount of resources available to an ILLR  is 
limited  and full financing  of a bank run is not feasible,  a partial bailout 
may  be  worse  than  no  bailout  at all.  For example,  Zettelmeyer  (1999) 
shows  that limited crisis lending may be counterproductive  by financing a 
run rather than  avoiding  one.  Specifically,  a limited  bailout  could  lead 
more investors  to run in a crisis, and even trigger a crisis if there is a large 
investor  or a coalition  of investors.  Similarly, Goldfajn and Valdes (1999) 
show  that if partial financing  is provided,  the ILLR  does  not necessarily 
reduce the probability  of financial runs and banking  cum exchange-rate 
crises, if its existence  leads to more reserves being  available at the initial 
exchange  rate in case of a crisis. 
Semicoercive  private-sector  involvement  can also  be  counterproduc- 
tive.  It is known  that capital controls  (on outflows)  that are unexpected 
can be effective  in the  short run in postponing  a run (see Goldfajn and 
Valdes,  1999,  for  a recent  modeling  of  this).  However,  it is  also  well 
known  that expected  capital controls can cause a run and have perverse 
effects.  In this context,  for example,  part of the contagion  from Russia to 
Brazil and  other  emerging  markets  in  the  summer  of  1998 can be  ex- 
plained  by the  increased  subjective  probability  of capital controls being 
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in August  1998. Also,  as shown  by Goldfajn and Valdes (1999), private- 
sector  participation  conditions  can increase  the  probability  of financial 
runs if a large proportion  of foreign  investors  expect  to withdraw  their 
investments  without  a loss. 
Even rollover  options  that automatically  lengthen  the maturity of for- 
eign  debt  (such  as those  suggested  by Buiter and  Sibert,  1999) are not 
without  problems  Jeanne  (1999) shows  that,  in  a model  where  short- 
term foreign lending  is an equilibrium  discipline  device  for governments 
subject  to  a deficit  bias,  rollover  options  may  have  counterproductive 
effects. 
Private  contingent  credit  lines  (such  as  those  arranged  by  Mexico, 
Argentina,  and  Indonesia  with  their  creditors)  may  or may  not  work. 
They should  provide  funds  to a country whose  reserves  are under pres- 
sure  because  of  capital  flight  or contagion,  and  thus  dampen  market 
concerns  about a country's  ability to withstand  a flight episode.  But the 
amounts  that are being  mobilized  are often  small relative  to the size  of 
capital outflows.  Moreover,  it is not  obvious  that such  a credit facility 
truly  provides  new  net  resources  to  a  country  above  what  creditors 
would  have  otherwise  provided.  Creditors  can use  derivatives  and dy- 
namic hedging  strategies  if they  want  to ensure  that their net exposure 
to a country  is not increased  by the provision  of such contingent  credit 
lines. 
7.  The  Endogenous  Distribution  of Bank  Debt  Maturity 
An important issue  in financial crises is why  banks and domestic  agents 
borrow  short-term  if this makes  them  vulnerable  to a bank run.  In the 
model  presented  in the paper, a large stock of short-term debt relative to 
foreign  reserves  is a necessary  condition  for the existence  of an interna- 
tional  bank  run.  The  paper  provides  some  interesting  insights,  but 
leaves  open  a number  of issues.  Chang and Velasco show  that if domes- 
tic residents  are risk-neutral,  they  are indifferent  to the maturity struc- 
ture of the bank debt, while  if they are risk-averse,  they will not borrow 
short-term  at all. This leaves  open  the question  of why  so much  debt is 
short-term.  The authors  suggest  that to get  an equilibrium  with  short- 
term debt one needs  to introduce  a market failure. The authors suggest 
four alternative reasons why  such a market failure can exist. The last two 
are: "the expectation  of a bailout,  whether  rational or not,  encourages 
reckless  behavior;  reckless  behavior  may  indeed  make  a bailout  more 
likely, thereby having  external effects." 
Indeed,  the  authors  come  to agree  that,  in order to explain  the bias 
towards  short-term debt that is necessary  for their theory of international 74 *  ROUBINI 
bank runs,  it may be necessary  to rely on the moral-hazard  distortions 
deriving from implicit and explicit government  guarantees,  as stressed by 
fundamentals  explanations  of  the  crisis  (see  Krugman,  1998; Corsetti, 
Pesenti,  and Roubini,  1998, 1999a, b; and McKinnon and Pill, 1990). 
8. Implications  for the Choice  of the Exchange-Rate  Regime 
An interesting  stylized  fact is that most  currency and financial crises in 
the 1990s have occurred under regimes  of relatively fixed exchange  rates 
(e.g.,  ERM,  1992-1993;  Mexico  and  the  tequila  crisis,  1994-1995;  the 
Asian  crisis,  1997-1998;  Russia,  1998; Brazil, 1999). Chang  and Velasco 
study  the  role  of  exchange-rate  regimes  in  financial  crises  and  find  a 
number  of interesting  results.  For example,  they  find  that under  a re- 
gime of fixed exchange  rates with no capital controls,  international  bank 
runs are even  a bigger  problem  because  all the short-term  assets  of the 
country, whether  denominated  in foreign or in domestic  currency, can be 
converted  into  foreign  assets  and  thus  become  claims  against  central 
bank reserves.  Flexible exchange  rates suffer less from this problem, but 
with two big caveats.  First, attempts  to purchase  foreign  assets  that lead 
to a run on  reserves  under  fixed  rates will  lead  to sharp exchange-rate 
depreciation  under  flexible  exchange  rates.  Second,  we  cannot  rule out 
international  bank  runs  under  flexible  exchange  rates.  If  short-term 
foreign-currency-denominated  assets  of  a country  are high  relative  to 
reserves,  a self-fulfilling  no-rollover  crisis may  occur. Thus,  a financial 
crisis or banking crisis may also occur under flexible exchange  rates. 
So  we  have  an  explanation  in  the  paper  of  why  international  bank 
runs more likely  to occur under  fixed rates. There are however  alterna- 
tive  explanations  of  such  twin  crises.  First,  currency  crises  may  often 
occur because  the  fixed  parities  are not  consistent  with  the underlying 
fundamentals.  Twin  crises  can  be  then  understood  by  observing  that 
fixed exchange  rates are an important  element  of the moral hazard cre- 
ated by governments.  If banks  and firms are promised  a pegged  parity, 
they  will borrow  too much  in foreign  currency, as the  cost of capital is 
biased by the promise  of a fixed parity. Then,  the implicit public liability 
of the fixed-rate promise  can become  very large once a devaluation  leads 
to a collapse  of the  banking  system  and  financial  distress  for corpora- 
tions.  Thus, fixed rates create moral hazard and lead to financial fragility 
and vulnerabilities  in the corporate and financial system. 
What is the policy  implication  of such an analysis?  In one view  that is 
becoming  increasingly  popular,  emerging  markets should  either let their 
currency float or pick fixed-rate regimes  that are truly credible and sus- 
tainable  (specifically,  currency  boards  supported  by  strong  fundamen- Comment  *  75 
tals). Fixed but adjustable peg regimes may be the worst of all, as they do 
not provide  either policy  credibility or enough  exchange-rate  flexibility. 
9.  Conclusion 
As I said at the outset,  this is a very interesting  and important paper that 
will be widely  read. It discusses  in a unified  and sophisticated  analytical 
framework  a set  of important  positive  and  normative  issues.  I am not 
convinced,  though,  by the paper's conclusion  that the recent twin crises 
episodes  were  mostly  due  to  self-fulfilling  international  bank  runs. 
While overshooting  of asset prices driven by sudden  reversals  of capital 
flows  may  have  played  a role  in  recent  crisis  episodes,  an  alternative 
explanation  centered  on  structural  weaknesses  of  the  financial  sector 
and  distortions  caused  by  government  policies  appears  to  provide  a 
better interpretation.  The issue  of whether  twin  crises are due to funda- 
mentals  or to  multiple-equilibrium  runs  and  panics  is  central  for  the 
validity of one of the main policy implications  of the paper, i.e.,  the need 
for an international lender of last resort. Designing  and implementing  an 
ILLR is difficult and may result in perverse  effects in cases where  crises 
are triggered by weak fundamentals. 
The views presented in the paper are solely those of the author and do not represent  the 
views of any institution  with which the author  is affiliated. 
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Chilean  system,  which  imposes  what  amounts  to a 600-basis-point  im- 
plicit  tax  on  short-term  capital  inflows.  Despite  this  system,  he  said, 
since  1996 an average  of 50% of Chile's international  debt has been  due 
within  a year,  a shorter maturity  structure than  that of Mexico,  which 
does not restrict short-term flows.  Velasco responded  that capital restric- 
tions  which  penalize  short-term  borrowing,  such  as those  instituted  by 
Chile,  could  still  be  helpful  by  lengthening  the  maturity  of  the  debt. 
While recognizing  that capital controls also entail costs,  he emphasized 
the need  to find the right tradeoff between  their costs and benefits. 
Martin Feldstein  approved  of the  paper's  emphasis  on  international 
illiquidity, which  must  be clearly distinguished  from problems  of insol- 
vency.  Bagehot taught us how  to deal with  illiquidity: by lending  freely 
against good  collateral. Whether this is feasible  in the international  con- 
text is an open  question.  The IMF has disbursed  large loans but has not 
been  a true lender  of last resort; in particular, it neither lends  freely nor 
takes collateral. An interesting  question  is whether  it is possible  in some 
cases  for private  lenders  to step  in  and  provide  international  liquidity 
against collateral: An example  is Mexico's pledging  of its oil export earn- 
ings  as collateral. Feldstein  conceded  that relying  on private lenders  for 
liquidity  had many  problems,  but thought  it still might be an approach 
worth  exploring.  Velasco agreed with  the comments,  but noted  that the 
emphasis  of  their  paper  was  on  "self-help"  by  small  countries  rather 
than on the international  financial architecture. Feldstein  also wondered 
whether  countries  might  be  able to increase  liquidity  on  their own  by 
borrowing  large  quantities  of  reserves  in  advance  of  the  crisis,  as  op- 
posed  to relying on current-account surpluses  to build reserves.  The cost 
of such  a policy  might be reduced  by holding  higher-yielding  securities 
than T-bills, although  this implies  potential  issues  of risk and illiquidity. 
Anil  Kashyap  defended  the  Diamond-Dybvig  model  by  saying  that 
one could model a collapse of working-capital  lending and a general credit 
crunch  within  this  framework.  In general,  if banks  create net  liquidity 
they must be exposed,  and if they have to retrench there must be conse- 
quences somewhere  in the economy. Kashyap also suggested  that looking 
at where the credit crunch hit in Asia would be useful.  He encouraged  the 
authors to extend their Table 1 to include Singapore,  Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
and  other  emerging-market  economies  that  survived  the  crisis  to  see 
whether  their experiences  confirm the liquidity  story. Velasco noted  that 
one  important  difference  between  their  approach  and  the  Diamond- 
Dybvig  model  is that some  people  who  legitimately  need  a capital infu- 
sion cannot  get it when  there is a bank run, and this imposes  real costs. 
This feature seems  consistent  with  Kashyap's  observation. 
Ben Bernanke asked  how  the  model  accommodates  contagion.  Does 78 *  DISCUSSION 
the authors' model  do a better job than a story based on fundamentals  in 
explaining  why  crises appear to jump from one country to another? 
Pierre Gourinchas  noted  the implication  of Table 1 that the level of the 
ratio  of  short-term  debt  to  international  reserves  determines  whether 
there will be a crisis, as opposed  to changes  in this variable.  An impor- 
tant  question  not  addressed  by  the  paper  is  how  long  a country  can 
survive  in the "danger zone."  Gourinchas also suggested  that it is impor- 
tant to look at the converse  of the question  studied  in the paper, i.e.,  do 
banking or currency crises always  follow  a lending  boom partly financed 
by international  capital? He said that his work with  Rodriguez  and Val- 
dez suggested  otherwise. 
Velasco responded  that being in the danger zone appeared to be neces- 
sary but not sufficient  for a crisis. His reading  of the empirical literature 
on  contagion  is that fundamentals  help  to explain  crises but that there 
are  large  unexplained  residuals,  suggesting  that  there  may  be  self- 
fulfilling elements  to crises. He disagreed  with Roubini's suggestion  that 
depositors  do not run on solvent  banks,  arguing  that the health  of bal- 
ance sheets  after the crisis, when  the economy  is weak  and asset prices 
have collapsed,  can be misleading.  If the crisis had not taken place, asset 
values  would  be higher,  working-capital  flows  would  be uninterrupted, 
and the bank's balance  sheet  might  look very  different.  Hence,  to con- 
clude for example  that the high cost of Mexico's bank bailout implies that 
all the banks were  insolvent  is incorrect. 